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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education enhances one’s ability to receive, decode,  
and understand information,  
and that information processing and interpretation  
is important for performing or learning to perform many jobs. 
(Richard R. Nelson and Edmund S. Phelps, 1966). 
 
 
There is a wide consensus on the role played by education in stimulating growth processes, 
according to the perspective that social returns to education extend beyond private returns. This 
work analyses empirically the effects of different reforms in education on attainment, fertility and 
labor market. We show that policies that help access to schooling and increase educational 
attainment have an impact on fertility choices and on employment.  
The first part is dedicated to explore how educational attainment varies after reforms in 
compulsory education and can be seen as a starting point for further analysis that make use of these 
kind of laws to instrument for education. In order to test reforms’ efficacy we collect data and 
background information on thirty countries, so to include both developed and developing countries, 
doing our best to extend the analysis as much as possible. So we select those countries where the 
reforms have been implemented during the last fifty years of the last century and for which we have 
reliable individual level data. We first perform a country study that helps us to find the most 
suitable way for identifying people’s exposure to the reforms, solving problems posed by migration, 
mobility and by low quality of data. Then, using a standard linear model, we analyze reform’s 
average effect on the full set of countries. Overall the reforms had a positive effect on educational 
attainment, even if there is great variability among the countries considered.  
The question on whether the distribution of education is altered after the reforms is also 
addressed in a quantile regression framework. Our results show that the reforms had a bigger impact 
on the first quartile, consistently with the change in minimum leaving age caused by the reforms. 
After this first introductory part about the characteristics of the effects of reforms in compulsory 
education, we focus on a single country and we investigate whether education, instrumented by a 
reform in compulsory education, affects teenage fertility and women labor market participation (see 
Chapter 2).   
This study makes use of a representative sample of Ecuadorian women taken from two waves 
of censuses. The reform, implemented in 1977, increased compulsory education by three years and 
made the completion of lower secondary education mandatory.  
The case of Ecuador is relevant because teenage fertility rate is high and women average 
educational level low, so that women are frequently unskilled and often unemployed. Early fertility 
hampers women to complete even basic schooling and is associated to subsequent poor mothers’ 
and children’s outcomes. So according to this perspective, a reform in compulsory education is 
promoting investment in human capital and can potentially help breaking poverty traps.  
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Results show that education, which is positively affected by the reform, is endogenous with 
respect to teenage childbearing. So using the reform as instrument is a way to solve endogeneity 
problems and get unbiased estimates of the impact of fertility on education. There are many reasons 
why education can be endogenous to teenage fertility: women with strong labor market preferences 
can decide to invest more in education and less in fertility, or vice versa, or they can drop out of 
school because of childbearing or the other way round.  
Results show that completing lower secondary school lowers the likelihood of early 
motherhood by 7%. We then extend the analysis to include women’s labor supply in a model that 
takes into account simultaneously also education and early motherhood. As expected, education, 
while decreases teenage childbearing, increases women’s labor force participation; in turn, teenage 
motherhood has negative effects of labor supply The last section concludes stressing the potential 
intergenerational effects of changes in the age at first birth, showing that firstborn children born to 
older mothers have better educational outcomes than those born to younger ones.  
From a policy perspective a reform in compulsory education can be considered not only as a 
way for increasing average educational level, but also as a tool to promote better women’s 
outcomes, that in this case are represented by lowered early motherhood rate and by increased labor 
market participation.  
The last chapter takes into account a reform that reorganized the Italian university system in 
2001. So we explore labor market outcomes of such a reform using a survey that collects 
employers’ preferences over prospective workers. This is a relevant issue because this process as 
part of the Bologna Process, aimed at creating a common and harmonized educational system in 
Europe, and its labor market effects haven’t been explored yet.  
Before 2001 students attended a unitary system that lasted four to five years, while with the 
reform a two-tier system is introduced. A two-years MA equivalent degree now follows a three-
years BA degree, and students can decide whether to take only the BA degree or to continue for five 
years and specialize. While scholars showed that the reform increased access to tertiary education 
and decreased drop out ratio and age at degree, it’s not yet clear what happens when students start 
looking for a job.  
So first we explore whether graduates are more likely to be hired after the reform or not, 
focusing on the type of jobs for which they are required. Results show that in fact the expected 
demand for high skilled human capital has slightly increased in the post reform era, especially for 
technical and clerical professions. Even if not precisely estimated, the increase in the demand for 
graduates grew at a lower rate than its supply. We also investigate how employers chose between 
BA or MA graduates, but this preference is not clearly defined yet.  
Data also show that there are differences on how preferences are shaped over the disciplines 
in which people are specialized: in the post reform era there is an increase in the share of those with 
a scientific and humanities degrees, and a decline of those that come from science-political studies.  
We present and discuss the potential confounding factors that could alter the increase in the 
demand for graduates that we observe: the reform in the employment protection regulation, the 
2008 crisis and a general growing trend. Evidence suggests that those factor should not lead to 
overestimate the demand for skilled personnel.  
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1 Chapter 1: Fifty years of compulsory school reforms: evidence from a cross-
section of countries 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Abstract 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century reforms in compulsory education laws aimed at 
increasing educational attainment in many countries. Using individual-level data from a cross-
section of country, the question on whether these reforms had the expected effect is addressed. In a 
regression discontinuity design framework, reforms effects are controlled by mean of a standard 
linear model, focusing on the average effect, and of a quantile regression model. An introductory 
part based on a single country study will give advices on the best strategy to identify individuals’ 
exposure to the reform, taking into account migration and internal mobility, and problems related to 
low quality of data and discrepancies among them. Then the overall effect of the reforms is 
considered on a cross section of countries and the results show that the average effect is positive, 
even if there are substantial differences among the countries considered. Reforms play a role in 
reducing inequality of educational attainment, having a positive impact on people who belong to the 
lower quantiles of the distribution of education.  
 
 
1.2 Introduction 
 
Endogeneity is a problem common to many empirical studies that make use of human capital 
as an explanatory variable. Thus education, which usually proxies human capital, has been 
instrumented in various way in order to get consistent estimates of the effect of human capital on 
different outcomes: wages (Angrist and Krueger, 1991 Duflo 2001, Meghir and Palme, 2005, 
among others), fertility (Monstad et al., 2008, Black et al. 2008) and health (Behrman and Wolfe, 
1989, Glewwe, 1999, among others).  
This chapter is aimed at finding out if reforms in compulsory education laws have an impact 
on educational attainment, so to provide further evidence in support of the use of the reforms as an 
instrument for education. Not only we show how reforms are effective, but also we suggest 
strategies that are useful for tackling the issue of identifying correctly people that are exposed to 
reform or, more in general, to programs. In our sample individuals are targeted by compulsory 
education reforms according to their age and so we analyse reforms’ impact by mean of the research 
discontinuity design method. This strategy can be pursued to study causal effects of programs (here 
reforms in compulsory education), to which individuals are assigned if an observable characteristic 
(here age) is below/above an exogenously given threshold. This method is valid if people can not 
modify their characteristic so to be voluntarily be assigned to the program. The idea behind the 
impact assessment using RD is that the sample in the neighborhood of the cutoff point represents 
features of randomized design, because individuals vary only in their treatment status.  
In the empirical literature the reforms in compulsory education are a very frequent instrument 
for schooling and so here we provide a set of ‘guidelines’ for correctly measuring the variation in 
educational attainment caused by reforms. A precise estimation of a reform impact is crucial for 
having an instrument strongly correlated with the potential endogenous regressor.  
An introductory part will be dedicated to explore how to identify people’s exposure to 
reforms and how to measure schooling level at best. This is done considering a single country only, 
Canada. 
In particular the focus will be: the way in which educational attainment is defined (schooling 
years, detailed level, general level); the identification of individuals by place of residence or by 
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place of birth (also foreign born people will be treated); how broad should be set the cohort of 
treated and not treated group (1, 2 or more years before and after the reform) and finally it will be 
considered a last case where the exact date of reform is not known, but only the decade in which it 
was implemented. In general, this first part will be devoted to deal with problems of poor 
information about the institutional changes and lack of details about identification of the group of 
people involved in those changes; we show how reforms’ impact measurement varies as 
individuals’ exposure to reform is determined differently, so to define the best model to fit the 
available data.  
Then we extend the analysis to a larger dataset and we explore reforms’ effects on average 
educational attainment and on quantiles of the education distribution different from the mean.  
We will take into account not only average treatment effect, but also variations in the 
distribution of educational attainment, to see whether the dispersion of education increases or 
decreases after a reform. A policy change on the minimum leaving age can affect average 
attainment, but can also reduce inequality of education, bringing to school those who belong to 
lower quantiles (as Eide and Showalter, 1998, and Brunello, Fort and Weber, 2009, show). To 
investigate this point a simultaneous quantile regression model will be used.  
The fact that reforms affect more people at lower quantiles can be seen as an argument in 
favour of the human capital against sorting hypothesis (Lang and Kropp, 1986). If education is just 
a signal on the labour market, after a reform educational attainment should increase uniformly 
across all individuals, while if human capital hypothesis holds reform should affect only targeted 
people. For the human capital hypothesis to hold, as we are considering reforms in compulsory 
education, it must be that people mostly affected are those that belong to the lower quantiles of 
education’s distribution.1 
This work makes use of individual level data, from both censuses and surveys, and about 30 
countries are taken into account; in the next section we will start exploring the data sources that will 
be used in the whole chapter. 
 
 
1.3 Data 
 
1.3.1 The reforms on compulsory schooling 
Information about reforms are collected using the Eurydice Information Network on 
Education, which contains an exhaustive source for all European countries (including new entrants), 
and from Unesco project Education for All (EFA), which instead provides reports for the rest of the 
World. When the information about the reform on compulsory schooling was not clearly specified 
or even missing EFA has been considered jointly with specific country sources, such as single 
country studies. If necessary the relevant laws have been looked up. All the sources used and the 
countries considered are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
For the purpose of this work only reforms implemented after the Second World War have 
been taken into account so that people in the treated, in the not treated and in the control groups are 
not too old when surveyed. To consider reforms further back in time would be problematic, since 
the surveys and censuses, the sources of individual data used here, were made at the end of the last 
century. Including old aged people can potentially lead to bias estimates if death is not a random 
event (for instance, if it is correlated with income and education). As a consequence some countries, 
such as US, Japan and South Korea, for which data were available but reforms were implemented 
before 1950, were excluded. For the opposite reason even too recent reforms have been left out, 
since pupils in the treated group would be too young and, thus, the effect of the reform would be 
underestimated (we might truncate the distribution of education because people are still student). To 
overcome the restrictions posed by some recent reforms so to include as many countries as possible, 
                                                 
1
 We would expect opposite results if reforms on higher education we would have been taken into account.  
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years of schooling, which is our outcome variable, will be constrained to be lower or equal to 17 in 
the case of Canada and to 15 when the full set of countries is considered. 
 
1.3.2  Individual data 
Individual-level data come from two sources as they are collected by two different 
institutions. IPUMSI (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International) data are censuses 
from different countries harmonized by the Minnesota Population Centre. IPMUSI covers all the 
non-European countries in this study, plus Greece and Romania.  
ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) data are collected from different surveys taken 
in various years (from 1985 to 2006) and they cover sociological topics; even if topics change every 
year, it’s still possible to retrieve some basic information uniformly across years, such as age, 
gender, years of schooling and maximum educational attainment. Since the number of people 
surveyed each year in each country is around 1500, many years have been pooled to build each 
country’s dataset. Moreover, since every single survey reflects a specific topic, it can be biased in 
some direction and so using different years we can prevent the data from being biased.  
The two sources differ in the way people can be identified. In general we can say that 
IPUMSI, as it’s a collection of harmonized censuses, is more detailed and potentially reliable then 
ISSP. Having a quick look at the countries included in the two groups, one can note that quality of 
data are inversely related to income, which is quite unusual. So almost all Latin American countries 
(except Uruguay), African countries, plus Greece, will be treated with a greater level of accuracy 
then the European countries (see again Table A.1).  
Going into further details, given the specific aims of this work, the main difference is that 
while in the IPUMSI data is possible to identify people according to the nation of birth, in the ISSP 
data this is not possible, since the only information we have is country of residence. To know the 
place of birth is important when trying to determine the place where the person received education 
and, even if we can not be fully confident about where he or she was educated, it’s better then just 
knowing residence when adult. So in the ISSP data we can not exclude foreign born people and in 
the case of Germany we will only use province of residence, while we should identify people by 
province of birth (länder).2  
Another point is that while in the ISSP data is never possible to control for race, in IPUMSI 
for Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador, we can check for differences in the 
attainment among minorities. In Brazil the non-white group includes indigenous, black and Asian 
people, in Canada blacks and Chinese, in Colombia blacks and indigenous, in Costa Rica blacks, 
indigenous and Asian and in Ecuador blacks, mestizos, mulattos and indigenous.  
The last important difference is the way in which educational attainment is expressed, when 
levels are considered; since ISSP is not harmonized, there are discrepancies in the codes and in the 
definitions used. So, when information about the level attained is needed, it will be only taken into 
account a broad definition which is uniform across sources (such as primary schooling) and all the 
other existing definitions won’t be considered (such as some primary, lower secondary, incomplete 
secondary, some college, and so on…).  
 
 
1.4 Methodological issue 
 
1.4.1 The case of Canada: the institutional framework  
Since our purpose is to study the effect of compulsory education reforms on educational 
attainment, we dedicate this introductory part to investigate potential confounding factors in the 
data that could blur a reform’s effects. The case of Canada will be helpful in providing some 
indications on how to better identify people’s exposure to reforms. Canada has been considered in 
                                                 
2
 In Germany and Canada reforms have been implemented in different years in each province, but since for Canada the 
IPUMSI data were used it was possible to distinguish the province of birth and not only province of residence.   
A. De Paoli – Essays on education reforms  Chapter 1 
 8 
this preliminary study, because of two specific features: compulsory schooling legislation differs 
across provinces and by time of implementation and people are quite likely to move across 
provinces during their lifetime or to migrate to Canada from abroad. Moreover, different definitions 
of schooling attainment are available. So the case of Canada on one side poses some problems in 
terms of identification, but on the other allows us to tackle these problems because data source for 
Canada – IPUMSI – is detailed and reliable.  
In Canada the implementation of reforms in compulsory education shows time and territorial 
variation (see Table 1) and minimum school leaving age (MLA) after the reform is 16. In all 
provinces, but two, compulsory schooling was increased by 1 year, so from the age of 15 to 16. In 
Manitoba and in New Brunswick instead MLA before the reform was 14 years.3  
 
Province of birth, Canada 
Reform 
year 
MLA 
after 
MLA 
before 
Treated 
age in 2001 
( age ) 
Newfoundland 1987 16 15 35 
New Brunswick 1966 16 14 48 
Quebec 1988 16 15 27 
Ontario 1954 16 16 52 
Manitoba 1962 16 14 52 
Saskatchewan 1965 16 15 50 
Alberta 1970 16 15 45 
British Columbia 1990 16 15 25 
North-western Territories, Prince Edward 
Island 1980 16 15 35 
Table 1 Reform in compulsory education in the Canadian Provinces. Source: Oreopoulos (2005). 
 
Individual data are taken from the 2001 census and, according to the reforms’ setting, the first 
treated cohort is composed by those that are 14 years old (or 13 for Manitoba and New Brunswick) 
when the reform was implemented.4 Those that are already 15 when the reform was enacted instead 
compose the not-treated group. In the next section we will give the details of the model used for the 
analysis. 
 
1.4.2 RD design method 
 Both in this introductory part and in the rest of this chapter, in order to estimate the effect of 
the reform we will follow a regression discontinuity (RD) designs framework that was first 
introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960). This approach is very popular whenever 
scholars want to estimate programs’ effect on various economic outcomes, such as in Angrist and 
Lavy (1999) and in Black (1999), among others. This method is particularly useful in all the non-
experimental settings where individuals are assigned to the treated or non-treaded group, depending 
on the value taken by a specific variable over which they do not have control (see Lee 2008 and Lee 
and Lemieux 2010).  
The RD designs requires that a threshold in an observed characteristic defines the treated and 
the non-treated groups and assumes that individuals close to the cut-off point (just above or just 
below) are identical in all the characteristics but the assignment (observable) variable. 
The outcome variable of interest is represented by iY , years of schooling of individual i. 
Assignment to the treatment is determined by individuals’ age so that the dummy variable iR  is 
                                                 
3
 An exhaustive report on the history of the Canadian schooling legislation throughout the last century can be found in 
the work done by Oreopoulos (2005).  
4
 We decide not to include those that are 15 years old in the year of the reform, since the law was enforced from the 
subsequent year onward.  
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equal to 1 if individual is younger than a cut-off age and 0 otherwise, )( jii ageageIR ≤≡ . Let 
)1(iY  and )0(iY  denote the potential outcomes for each individual being exposed and not exposed to 
the reform respectively, so that the outcome that we want to estimate is )]0([)]1([ ii YEYE − .  
According to the RD design method we look at the discontinuity in the conditional 
expectation of our outcome given age, so to find out the average causal effect of the reform. So in 
our case, the impact of the intervention is given by the difference in mean outcome (schooling) of 
the treated and the non treated groups in the neighborhood of the cutoff point. We assume that all 
other individual’s characteristics do evolve smoothly around the cut-off age, so that the average 
outcome of those just above the threshold age could be used as a counterfactual for the one of those 
just below (that are treated by the reform). We choose to use individuals that are two years older 
and younger than the cut-off age determined by the year of reform’s implementation, so to be as 
close as possible to the threshold age and at the same time have enough observation to perform the 
analysis.  
In order to have more precise estimates of the reform’s effect we also control for sex, race, 
residence, province of birth. So we fit the following linear regression model and we estimate the 
average reform’s effect: 
iiii XRY εββ +Γ++= '10        (equation 1) 
where X represents the set of control covariates. This setting is identical to the one that we 
will be using when dealing with the full set of countries.  
Since years of schooling are not available in the IPUMSI dataset for Canada, the levels in 
their detailed version have been converted into years, according to Table 1 in the Appendix. To do 
this not only the IPUMSI data set has been taken into account, but also the ISSP survey, where both 
the levels and the years of schooling are available. In the ISSP dataset, the definition of levels is 
quite different form the IPUMSI definition, but we managed to get anyway some supplementary 
information about the average number of years necessary to complete primary, lower secondary, 
secondary and tertiary education. In this way we could transform IPUMSI levels of education into 
years. Different codings have been tried and results obtained in the regressions do not vary much; 
so the coding in Table 1 in the Appendix will be used in this part and in the rest of the study. 
Note that, since in some provinces the reform affects people that are 23 years old, we decide 
to include those with a post-graduate degree in the same category of those with a university (BA) 
degree, thus censoring years of schooling at 17.   
Now the following sections will take into account the confounding factors one by one, 
starting from people’s mobility, and the reference model is the one that we just introduced. 
 
1.4.3 Mobility - Province of birth vs. province of residence 
Since 38% of the sample doesn’t live in the province of birth and reforms were implemented 
at different times in different provinces, it is relevant to investigate whether the reforms’ effects 
vary according to the definition of people’s exposure to reforms, if by place of residence or by place 
of birth. While in Canada people’s mobility is a relevant phenomenon, we assume that in other 
European countries, for which the information about place of birth is not available, but would be 
important for identifying the treated group, internal migration flows are relevant to a lesser extent at 
the time of reforms.  
So two models are compared: one in which the exposure to the law is defined by place of 
birth and another where it is defined by the place of residence and the simple ordinary least square 
model of eq. 1 has been performed. 
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Results (see columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 in the Appendix) show that the coefficient for the 
treatment differs in the two cases, so, as expected, mobility is a relevant issue when dealing with 
problems related to people exposure to laws.5  
The resulting reform’s coefficient is slightly higher in the case in which individuals are 
identified according place of birth, surely because, in order to determine the exact place where 
people were living when the reforms were implemented, place of birth is a better proxy than place 
of residence. So, from now we will identify individuals on the basis of their province of birth. 
Unfortunately only the IPUMSI samples will allow this distinction, while ISSP is based on 
province of residence. For example Germany will be treated according to people residence, even if 
laws were implemented at different times in each province (länder). Brunello et al (2009) use the 
reforms in compulsory education as the instrument for schooling in a wage equation and indentify 
people’s exposure to reform using the ISSP data set, where the exact place of birth is not available; 
so in that case the estimation of the reforms’ effect in the case of Germany could be imprecise.    
 
1.4.4 Foreign born people 
Since almost 20% of the sample is foreign born, it could be interesting to include in the 
analysis foreign born people that migrate to Canada before the reform and that belong to the age 
cohort treated or to the control group. So a new dummy variable for treatment has been created in 
order to include also foreign born people that migrate to Canada early in their lifetime. Since the 
identification based on the place of birth gives more precise estimation, the new dummy variable 
include foreign born people according to their residence, but native Canadians are still identified by 
their place of birth.6 Results are shown in column (3) of Table 2. 
Including foreign born people bring almost the same results we had excluding them. The 
reform’s coefficient is smaller (0.17 against 0.2) and two explanations are possible: strangers are 
not affected by the laws as citizens, if for some reason they don’t respect the law or laws are 
enforced to a lesser extent. Also it could be possible that the educational attainment of migrants is 
on average higher then the level that became mandatory with the Canadians reforms considered, so 
that the treatment is not a treatment for them. Looking at the descriptive statistics on the level of 
education of foreign born people we notice that first of all they are on average more educated then 
native Canadians, and then that they are not affected by the laws, since the average years of 
schooling shows no variation between the non treated and the treated group (see Table 3 in the 
Appendix). On average migrants in the treated and non treated cohort have an educational level 
which is higher than the one set by Canadians reforms.  
In fact running a regression separately for foreign born people, we find out that the reform is 
completely ineffective (results shown in column (4) of Table 2). The reader should consider that 
there is evidence that Canada is one of the six largest skilled migrants receiver country (Defoort, 
2006), so it’s not surprising that foreign born people are not affected by Canadians reforms.  
This is to say that including people that were not born in the country of study must be done 
with caution, even if they belong to the treated group and if they migrate before the laws were put in 
act. We cannot assume that the distribution of the educational levels is the same between the 
                                                 
5
 The reader should note that in the regression showed in column 2 we excluded all individuals that live in the Atlantic 
Provinces and Territories (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Price Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, Yukon, 
Northwestern Territories and Nanavut), since the universe of definition of province of birth does not include the people 
born in these provinces. So province of birth is not reported for individuals that were born in one of these regions, but 
we only know province of birth of people not originally from these territories.  So for the case for which the province of 
birth is considered, we will concentrate only on Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British 
Columbia. 
6
 So we are assuming that the foreign born people don’t move anymore after migration and this is reasonable since only 
2% of the foreign born people changed province of residence – which is our unit of interest - in the last 5 years. This 
does not mean that they didn’t move before, but nevertheless we can use this information to somehow reinforce the 
assumption.    
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Canadians and foreign born people. So whenever it will be possible migrants will be excluded from 
the sample. 
 
1.4.5 Schooling years vs. general level attained (less then primary or no school at 
all, primary completed, secondary completed, tertiary completed).  
In the Canadian dataset two different definitions of educational attainment are possible: one 
detailed and one general (only the maximum level reached). This latter way potentially downward 
biases the effect of the reform since only the complete level is reported. Moreover if the reform is 
not targeted to the completion of a specific level, it might be the case that reform’s effect is not 
evident at all. However, since our purpose is to collect advices so to perform the analysis on a 
broader dataset, we prefer to rely on the general definition of education, as it’s more likely to be 
comparable across different contexts.  
Here we test whether the reforms had an impact on the probability of completing primary, 
secondary and tertiary education simultaneously. 
In the Table 4 in the Appendix there are the descriptive statistics for educational attainment 
for the cohort affected by reform and the cohort not affected. In both cases the exposed cohort has a 
higher mean with smaller variance then the not exposed, anyway when levels are considered the 
difference is very small. In this case levels considered are primary, secondary and tertiary education 
attained. Even if in some cases it’s available also some in-between levels (such as some primary, 
lower secondary, and so on), this broad definition has been preferred here as it’s fully comparable 
across samples; using a more detailed level definition would be meaningless for the final purpose of 
this preliminary part where we are defining the standards to identify people’s exposure to reforms. 
In order to estimate if the reform altered the probability to complete one of the three levels 
considered we perform an ordered probit model, using the same regressors as before. Reform’s 
effect is not statistically different from zero (results not reported). So using only the maximum level 
attained as the outcome to test for reform’s effects don’t lead to any relevant results and might be 
problematic when more detailed information about people’s schooling level is not available. In this 
case, if years of schooling were not available, we might have inferred that the reforms didn’t have 
an impact at all. So if we want to investigate the variations on educational attainment after a reform 
in compulsory education, the outcome should be education expressed in years and not in levels. 
Nevertheless, the use of education expressed in general levels can be fruitful whenever the reform 
had a strong impact, or if a specific level is the target itself.  
 
1.4.6 Length of the exposure to the treatment considered: 1 year after and before, 
or more? 
To extend the breadth of age cohorts in which the effect of reforms is observed can be 
problematic if the reform is recent because we include people that potentially have not completed 
their studies yet (thus underestimating the effect of the reform) and if other major reforms are 
enforced in the meanwhile (the larger is the span considered the more likely there could be other 
reforms or other events going over). Moreover, a general increasing trend can lead to overestimate 
the reform’s effect. The main advantage instead is to increase the number of observations and to 
capture the impact of a law even if there is some delay in its enforcement. Whenever IPUMSI data 
will be used, the number of observations will never be problematic since those data are collected 
from censuses; however, in the next section for many countries another database will be used and it 
might not be enough one or two years. So we first test how our baseline model reacts to increases in 
the age cohorts considered and then we take into account the largest possible cohort-model 
introducing a smoothing polynomial in age, which is a standard practice for a RD design strategy 
where the cohorts are wide enough to allow for a trend. 
 So first the regression in eq. 1 has been performed with different age cohorts before and after 
the reform: ±1, ±2, ±3, ±4, ±5, ±6 and ±7 years wide. In Table 5 we report the values of the 
reform’s coefficient in all these cases. The reform’s effect is almost stable to increases in the 
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cohorts’ wideness from ±6 onwards and there is evidence of a positive general trend, as the 
coefficient is increasing as cohorts are widening.  
In order to take into account the growing general trend problem we use the ±7 years cohort 
and we include a smoothing polynomial in age of different orders (see results in Table 6 in the 
Appendix). With a polynomial of order 2 or 3 the variance of the model (sum of the residuals 
corrected for degree of freedom) is stable and the reform’s effect (+0.17) is consistent to what we 
found in the first paragraph (+0.2), even if slightly smaller. In this last case the whole time span 
considered is 15 years, and since some reforms are very recent, it’s not reasonable to increase it any 
further, because people in the sample are too young and could be still at school.7 This is probably 
also the reason why the reform’s effect is smaller than in the case where we compared cohorts 2-
years wide.  
So according to these results, using a sample which is very close to the cut-off-age that 
assigns people to the treatment or using a larger age cohort, with a smoothing polynomial, are both 
valid strategies. Probably in the case of Canada, for which we have a large data set, but a bias due to 
the inclusion of young people, it’s more appropriate to rely on a comparison of cohorts close to the 
threshold age, while in other cases, where data sources are scarcer, it might be better to use the full 
sample with the polynomial. 
 
1.4.7  Generic exposure to the treatment: what happens if we ignore the year of the 
reform but we know the decade in which the reform was implemented.  
This exercise is meant to deal with the uncertainty about the precise date in which the reform 
was passed (as in Angrist and Krueger, 1991, for United States). So let’s suppose the only 
information we have is the minimum leaving age in every decade, without knowing exactly the year 
in which the reform was implemented. Table 7 in the Appendix summarizes the real year of the 
reform and the relative decade that will be used in this exercise.  
The decade variable (Table 7) will tell the next closest decade to the year of reform. For 
Quebec we are assuming that during all the eighties the minimum leaving age was 15, while from 
the nineties 16. Ontario will be an exception, because the cut-off decade should be 1950, but then 
the two groups that will be compared are people that are 15 during the forties and during the fifties. 
This might be problematic because the control group is composed by people that are too old when 
the census was made (2001) and so the next decade was considered. In this exercise the control 
group is composed by people that were in the treated age during the decade before the reform, while 
the treated group by people in the treated age in the decade after the treatment, so that the total time 
span is 20 years. So we perform the regression that includes also the polynomial in age so to correct 
for general trend (since we are using a large time span) and results show that the coefficient for the 
treatment is equal to +0.11 (see Table 8). So in this case the information about the precise date of 
the reform is crucial to observe correctly its impact. Using decades instead of the cut-off year leads 
to imprecise estimations, even if the general effect of the reform is preserved. Angrist and Krueger 
(1991) use reforms in compulsory schooling to instrument education in a wage equation, but their 
IV strategy lead to results that are not different from those obtained with OLS. Their information 
about the date in which laws were implemented is incomplete and they use, as in this exercise, the 
decades. In their case relying on more precise instruments might have lead to different result, as in 
the case of Canada that we are presenting. 
So, given the suggestions offered in this introduction, we can now precede the analysis with 
in a more robust way the effect of reforms.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Having young people in the treated group lead to underestimate the reform’s effect since they could be still at school 
and thus the maximum level that they could have reached can never be the highest possible (so the distribution of 
education for the treated group would be left truncated).  
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1.5 The model: a cross-countries analysis 
 
The introduction about Canada gives some advices to correctly identify people when all the 
countries are considered jointly; people should be classified according to birth place, rather then 
looking at residence; strangers should be excluded from the dataset; the breadth of treatment cohort 
should be of 2 years before and after the treatment if the dataset is large and the reforms 
implemented recently; if observation for each country are scarce also wider age cohorts can be used, 
provided general trends are controlled with smoothing polynomials; educational attainment should 
be proxied by years of schooling, rather then by general levels; if the exact date of the reform is not 
known, approximating it with decades in which it took place (if known) lead to imprecise estimates. 
Table A.2 in the Appendix summarizes statistics about each countries’ years of schooling.  
In order to test for changes in educational attainment in the post reform period, we divide 
people into treated and not treated group according to their age when the reform was implemented, 
following the same RD designs method that we used for Canada. In order to include as many 
countries as possible we censor years of schooling at 15, given that in many the reform has been 
implemented quite recently.8 All the countries included in the analysis and the reforms are listed in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix. As in the Canadian example, we decide to use the 2 years wide cohorts, 
so that we use individuals that are close to each countries cut-off date, and also the 7 years wide 
cohorts with the smoothing polynomial in age.  
 
1.5.1 Average effect of the reforms a linear model.  
In this section we present the result of the estimations of reforms’ average effect considering 
the full set of countries. We first find out what is the general reforms effect and then we detail the 
results exploring differences across countries.  
We replicate the regression modelled by equation (1) including in the matrix X for controls 
countries fixed effects (results are in column (1) of Table A.3 in the Appendix). Unfortunately we 
can not control whether school quality changed over time. An indicator that could potentially have 
been used is the pupil-teacher ratio (Barro and Lee, 2001, and UN dataset), but it’s available in an 
exhaustive way only some countries and years.9  
Then the same model of equation 1 is taken into account, but the cohorts are 7 years wide 
with a smoothing polynomial in age (see column (3) of the same table).10 
We also consider a richer specification where we interact the dummy for the treatment with 
each country fixed effect, so to explore cross countries variations of the impact of reform:  
iiiii XCRRY εβββ +Γ+++= ''10 )*(      (equation 2) 
where C is the matrix for countries fixed effects which is interacted with the reforms’ dummy.  
Errors are clustered at country level. 
Results are reported in column (3) of Table A.3 in the Appendix.  
                                                 
8
 This corresponds to the completion of at least some tertiary education, since in the majority of countries considered 
secondary schooling is completed after 12 years. Using this ‘recoding’ for educational level should not be troublesome 
since it corresponds to a level well above the target of the reforms taken into account.  
9
 By the way, it is still an open question if having more teaches relative to pupils is a signal of improved quality, 
especially if one looks to relationship between investment in education (pupil teacher ratio) and achievements, 
measured with standardized tests (Hanusheck, 1998). The assumption that policy makers have to allocate more money 
education to improve students’ performance is still quite controversial.  
10
 In this specification we also try to include controls for macro shocks that occurred around the same time of the 
reforms and that involved at least some people in the treated or the not treated group. The shocks considered are Second 
World War, the genocides in Rwanda, the Soviet regime and the Latin American regimes. In all these case the dummy 
is equal to 1 during the war, the regimes and the genocides, while it’s equal to 0 otherwise. So there are four different 
dummy variables, assuming that all the Latin American regimes had the same effect on those countries; the same 
reasoning holds for all the countries under the Soviet influence. All the information on macro shocks are retrieved from 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, various years. Since the results show that those events didn’t impact average schooling 
level in our specification, we decide to exclude them from the final regressions.  
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The results from the regression that refers to equation 1 show that the coefficient for treatment 
is equal to 0.14 (p<0.05). This means that in the five years after the reform average schooling 
increased by 0.14 years. This result is not explicative about the different reform’s impact between 
countries, but give a general idea of the effectiveness of reforms.  
Results also show that being a female and white is associated with higher educational level, 
which is coherent with the fact that in many countries considered general ethnical minorities are 
disadvantaged and women have higher educational level. This last result does not generally hold for 
developing countries, but those countries are less represented in our sample.  
This model is telling that all the countries experienced a growth in educational attainment just 
after the reform, provided that no major other events happened in the meanwhile. Even if we 
consider wider age cohort (7 years before and after) and we include a polynomial in age, the 
reforms’ impact is still of a comparable magnitude (+0.14 vs. +0.187). This difference in the two 
models can probably be explained by the fact that some reforms might be enforced with some 
delays, even if we don’t know precisely why this happened. 
When the parameters of the reforms are free to vary across countries, we can observe that the 
impact of reforms differs across countries. So now we explore the reform’s impact in every country 
using the interaction terms and the procedure clearly described by Suits (1984). This method allows 
to determine what is each country reform’s effect with respect to an average level.11 We rank 
countries according to the reform’s strength in Table A.4 in the Appendix.  
For 22 countries out of 35 the parameter for treatment is positive and significant, while for 13 
it is negative. First of all the reform’s coefficient is not explicative of the reform’s impact in 
absolute terms but only with respect to an average of the countries considered here. The reform’s 
coefficients computed following the Suits method shows what is the impact of reform in each 
country with respect to the average effect of all the reforms considered. For Argentina, Panama, and 
the Philippines the problem might be that those that are in the treated group are very young 
(between 18 and 19 years old), so that their schooling level is severely censored even if we decided 
that in this exercise the maximum years of schooling is 15. For the Czech Republic instead the 
negative results could be due to the fact that in 1984 the MLA was set to 16 years of compulsory 
schooling, but in 1990 it was decreased to 15. This second subsequent reform might have altered 
our results. In fact if we exclude these four countries and we compare years of schooling before and 
after the reform for the other ‘problematic’ 9, we get that educational level actually increased in the 
post reform period.12 So for 9 countries the reforms simply were weakly enforced with respect to 
the others in this study, even if problems about number of observations and about historical events 
might have hampered reforms’ efficacy as well.13  
Overall, this linear model is telling that the majority of the countries experienced a growth in 
educational attainment. When the parameters of the reforms are free to vary across countries, we 
can observe that the impact of reform shows great variability: the reforms’ effect ranges from 
+0.016 of Slovenia to +0.62 of Bulgaria. This shed some light on the average effect of laws, 
showing relevant differences across countries. In the next section it will be analysed if along with 
variability across countries there is also variability within countries, comparing people at different 
point of the distribution of education. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This average level includes all the countries analyzed. 
12
 In the pre reform period average years of schooling for Romania, Slovak Republic, Venezuela, Denmark, Hungary, 
Mexico, Ecuador, Cyprus and Costa Rica was 9,2, while in the post reform it is 9,3.  
13
 For Slovak Republic and Cyprus, given that some observation are retrieved from old ISSP surveys, we can have the 
aforementioned censoring problem; for Romania the reform was implemented just before the Ceausescu regime and this 
concurrent event could have depress people’s educational investment. 
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1.5.2 The effects on the distribution of educational attainment with quantile 
regressions  
This part will be dedicated to exploring the effect of reforms on different points of the 
distribution of education. Do increases in minimum leaving age raise everyone’s educational 
attainment or they affect differently each quantile?  
This exercise can also be useful to tackle the argument according to which reforms are not 
really exogenous. If reforms were implemented in those countries where schooling attendance had 
already been increasing before the reform, the law is potentially endogenous. Landes and Salomon 
(1972) argue that laws that reform compulsory schooling are in fact endogenous; analysing the US 
at the end of the XIX century they conclude that the laws were not the cause of the increased 
attendance, as schooling levels were already increasing before the reforms. Their explanation is that 
the cost of passing a law is a positively related to the potential violators, so that no policy maker 
would ever enforce a law if costs were bigger than benefits (that is if the target of the reform is too 
far from the current level). So following this reasoning a compulsory school reform is enacted 
where schooling level is already increasing, otherwise no politicians would maintain consensus. 
Lleras-Munay (2001) performs the same analysis and concludes that reforms were not 
endogenous (and of course effective) for two reasons; first because the laws considered did not 
affect all the distribution of educational attainment in the same way, that is to say that the reforms 
increased the attainment of the lower percentiles of the distribution of education, thus reducing 
inequality; then she checked if future reforms can be used to predict current schooling level and 
findings confirms that future laws are not related to current attainment.  
So if all the distribution of education (people on every point of the distribution) shifts after a 
reform, it can be a signal that the reform is not really effective since what’s is increasing the 
educational attainment is a trend. So here a quantile regression model has been performed (as 
Lleras-Munay, 2001, and Brunello et al. (2009) did among others). With this approach it’s possible 
to see at what quantiles of the distribution of education the reform was more effective, given that we 
already know that on average it is.  
The model uses exactly the 7 years cohorts with the polynomial in age.14 To be more formal 
the quantile of interest is defined as q, and for each observation i, ri is the residual as in standard 
linear model:  
∑−=
k
ikkii xyr β           
Where yt is the dependent variable and xi reassumes all the explanatory variables. k 
( Κ= ...1κ ) are the regressors used before.  
Let’s define a multiplier hik which is equal to 2q if ri>0 and equal to 2(1-q), otherwise. So the 
problem is: 
∑i ii hr
kβ
min           
so the estimation procedure is a minimization of weighted residuals with weight hi. Consider 
also that it’s possible with the same technique to perform the regression at different quantiles 
simultaneously. The results coincide with the case of separate estimation but with the simultaneous 
equations model it’s possible to compare the coefficients across equations (the variance-covariance 
matrix is estimated entirely). This last approach has been followed and a simultaneous regression 
has been performed at different quantiles (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th), only in the general case 
(mean across country).  
The results, reported in Tables A.5 in the Appendix, show that the reforms were effective at 
the first quartile (coefficient equal to 0.013, p<0.1), while the effect is 0 at all the other point of the 
distribution that we tested. This result means that reforms on MLA successfully increase 
educational attainment of the targeted population. Since most of the reforms aimed at increasing 
                                                 
14
 Here we prefer to use a large time span rather the 2 years cohorts, since we are comparing different quantiles and so 
it’s crucial to have many observations in every point of the distribution of education.   
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total years of schooling to 9 years (even if with differences among countries), we can expect that 
basic education (the first stages of primary education) is not changing after this kind of reform (that 
is to say that literacy goals have already been reached). At the same time compulsory schooling 
reforms do not involve higher levels of education (such as secondary and tertiary). This means that 
the decision to complete secondary education or to go to college does not depend on laws that rise 
minimum leaving age. In principle we could have had also this kind of result if reforms changed the 
perceived importance of education increasing attainment even among people not directly 
constrained by the law; the effect of reforms could have propagated to all higher levels of 
education. This result instead is telling that schooling increased mainly among people that without 
the reform would have left school before the new minimum leaving age. This is consistent whit the 
human capital hypothesis as opposed to the sorting hypothesis (see Lang and Kropp, 1986).   
So the fact that the a lower quantile is more affected then higher means that reforms were 
effective and, moreover, we can see this as evidence of the fact that those reforms are not 
endogenous, since they do not homogeneously affect the distribution of education.  
The next section with present an analysis similar to the quantile approach, but with a more 
descriptive power. Instead of looking at quantiles, that we don’t know exactly what they stand for in 
terms of years of schooling, we will be studying the impact of reforms on primary schooling.  
 
 
1.5.3 Basic attainment and secondary schooling 
Here we perform a discrete choice model (probit) aimed at testing if the probability to 
complete primary schools is affected by the reform. So the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
individual completed primary schooling and to 0 if he didn’t. The model includes the explanatory 
variables of equation (1) and errors are clustered at country level. The probability of completing 
lower secondary schooling which would be a more appropriate test, given the reforms considered, 
could not be checked because data are collected from different sources that on this specific point 
present strong discrepancies.  
This approach is similar to the quantile regression model used before, but this time we the 
results will be easier to interpret since they are referred to a specific level achieved, while quantiles 
does not correspond to a precise level. As before, results will be presented in the general form (for 
all the countries) and in the detailed one. In the section about Canada we found a similar not 
encouraging result.  
On average reforms increase the probability to complete primary by 1,5% (p<0.001), even if 
the reforms didn’t target specifically these specific levels. The full set of marginal effects is listed in 
Table A.5 in the Appendix.  
So when the probability to complete primary school is considered, there might be positive 
reform’s effects in those country where the elementary level needs still to be reached by a 
significant number of people. Results obtained with the probit model tell that the reforms probably 
play a role in helping some countries in reaching basic attainment, represented by primary school.  
We also checked if the probability of completing secondary education is affected, but 
unfortunately this is not the case. Given the countries and reforms considered this would be 
probably a too ambitious outcome, since the reforms on average targeted a level which is below the 
completion of secondary school. 
 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
 
This analysis shows the effects of reforms on compulsory schooling that were implemented in 
the second half of the last century in various countries. The impact is studied on educational 
attainment, using a RD design framework. Given the increasing importance of reforms in education 
as a way for instrumenting individuals’ schooling, it’s relevant to analyze how to better measure 
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reforms’ impact. All the reforms considered here raised minimum school leaving age. We first give 
advices on the strategies that can be followed for determining reform’s impact on education using a 
single country as a reference. Than we perform the analysis on the full set of countries for which 
information about individuals and reforms are available.  
A linear regression model shows that reforms are effective on increasing average years of 
schooling by 1.4%. If in the same model the parameters for the effect of reform are let free to vary 
across countries, we obtain great variability between countries.   
A quantile regression approach takes into account variations on the distribution of education. 
We observe that reforms are most effective at the first quartile (coefficient equal to 0.014) leaving 
unaltered the other quantiles tested.  
The effect of reform is also studied in a probit model, where the impact of laws on the 
probability to complete primary schooling is taken into account. The reforms are found to have 
positive effects. 
Policies aimed at increasing compulsory schooling are successful on average and promote 
schooling among those at the lower tails of the distribution of education.  
Here we stress the importance of the circumstances under which educational level is 
influenced by reforms in compulsory education and of the empirical strategies that can be pursued 
for identifying correctly people assigned to the treatment, so that reforms can be used fruitfully 
whenever an instrument for schooling is needed. 
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1.7 Appendix 
 
Educational attainment   
Years of 
schooling 
Below grade 5 3 
Grades 5-8 7 
Lower secondary general completed 9 
Secondary completed 12 
Post-secondary technical education 14 
Some college completed 15 
University or more 17 
Table 1 Years of schooling and corresponding codes 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Different definitions of exposure to reform: Prov Resid 
Prov 
Birth(restr) 
Migrants 
included 
Only 
Migrants 
Reform, def by prov. of resid 0.19***     
Reform, def by prov. of birth§  0.2***    
Reform, def by prov. of birth (migrants 
included)   0.17***   
Reform, def by prov. of resid (migrants 
only)    -0.105 
White -0.55*** -0.1*** -0.14 0.78*** 
Female 0.3*** 0.25*** 0.2*** -0.14 
Prov of resid fx eff yes yes yes yes 
Prov of birth fx eff yes yes yes no 
Observations 7751 6856 7640 784 
R-squared 0.033 0.026 0.025 0.040 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
§ Here we include only Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Quebec and British Columbia 
provinces 
Table 2: comparisons among different strategies for identifying the correct target group. Column (1) refers the 
identification by province of residence, column (2) to province of birth. Columns (3) and (4) refer to migration 
status: column (4) is the same regression as the one showed in column (2), but migrants are included, while in the 
regression of column (4) we included only foreign born people.   
 
Average years of schooling 
  Non Migrants Migrants 
Before the reform 12.76 15 
After the reform 13 15 
Table 3 Summary statistics for years of schooling: group of migrants and non-migrants 
 
Average educational attainment, before and after the reform 
Before the reform After the reform 
obs mean st dev obs mean st dev 
3169 2.04 0.707 3279 2.07 0.69 
Note: 2 corresponds to secondary education completed.  
Table 4 Summary statistics for educational level, before and after the reform 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Cohort ±1 
year 
Cohort ±2 
years 
Cohort ±3 
years 
Cohort ±4 
years 
Cohort ±5 
years 
Cohort ±6 
years 
Cohort ±7 
years 
Reform, def by prov. of birth 0.131 0.199*** 0.212*** 0.257*** 0.306*** 0.323*** 0.318*** 
Observations 3414 6856 10235 13700 17232 20917 24518 
R-squared 0.021 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.025 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Table 5 Different coefficients obtained widening the cohorts considered. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cohort ±7 years 
Polynomial 
order 4 
Polynomial 
order 3 
Polynomial 
order 2 
Polynomial 
order 1 
Reform, def by prov. of birth 0.15* 0.17** 0.17** 0.19** 
Observations 24518 24518 24518 24518 
R-squared 0,032 0,031 0,031 0,025 
Res sum squares 185103 185387 185404 186450 
Degree of freedom 24500 24501 24502 24503 
Variance of the model 7,56 7,57 7,57 7,61 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Table 6: Test for reforms’ efficacy using a cohort 7 years wide and different order polynomials in age. 
 
 
 
  
True year Decade Minimum leaving age 
Total years of 
compulsory 
schooling 
Quebec 1988 1990 1516 910 
Ontario 1954 1960 16 810 
Manitoba 1962 1960 1416 79 
Saskatchewan 1965 1970 1516 89 
Alberta 1970 1970 1516 810 
British Columbia 1990 1990 1516 89 
Table 7 Date transformed into decade 
 
 
Def by decade 
Reform ,def by prov. of birth and by decades 0.11** 
White -0.79*** 
Female 0.32*** 
Observations 41501 
R-squared 0.077 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 8 Regression with the uncertainty about reforms implementation year  
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Country Reform 
Min 
leaving 
age 
after 
the 
reform 
Min 
leaving 
age 
before 
the 
reform 
Years of 
compulsory 
schooling 
after the 
reform 
Years of 
compulsory 
schooling 
before the 
reform 
Ind 
data 
sources Info on reforms  
Argentina 1993 15 12 10 7 ipumsi Unesco, Ley 24.195  
Austria  1962 15 14 9 8 issp Brunello et al (2009) 
Belgium 1983 18 14 12 8 issp Brunello et al (2009) 
Brazil 1971 14 11 8 5 ipumsi Unesco, EFA 
Canada:           ipumsi Unesco, Oreopoulos (2005) 
Quebec 1988 16 15 10 9   
Ontario 1954 16 16 10 8   
Manitoba 1962 16 14 9 7   
Saskatchewan 1965 16 15 9 8   
Alberta 1970 16 15 10 8   
British Colombia 1990 16 15 9 8   
Chile  1966 13 11 8 6 ipumsi Unesco, www.countrystudies.us 
Colombia 1991 15 10 9 4 ipumsi http://education.stateuniversity.com 
Costa Rica 1973 15 12 9 6 ipumsi Unesco, www.oei.es 
Cyprus 1985 15 12 10 7 issp Unesco, EFA, Eurydice 
Czech Republic 1984 16 15 10 9 issp Eurydice 
Denmark  1971 16 14 9 7 issp Brunello et al (2009), Eurydice 
Ecuador 1977 15 12 9 6 ipumsi 
http://www.tau.ac.il/eial/X_1/, 
Unesco 
Finland 1972-1977 16 13 9 6 issp Brunello et al (2009) 
Ghana 1985 15 12 9   ipumsi 
unesco, 
http://www.educatejournal.org 
Germany-West           issp Brunello et al (2009), Eurydice 
Schleswig-Holstein 1956 15 14 9 8   
Hamburg 1949 15 14 9 8   
Niedersachsen 1962 15 14 9 8   
Bremen 1958 15 14 9 8   
Nordrehin-Westfalen 1967 15 14 9 8   
Hessen 1967 15 14 9 8   
Rheinland-Pfalz 1967 15 14 9 8   
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1967 15 14 9 8   
Bayern 1969 15 14 9 8   
Saarland 1964 15 14 9 8   
Great Britain  1973 16 15 11 10 issp Eurydice 
Greece 1975 15 12 9 6 ipumsi Eurydice 
Hungary  1993 16 14 10 8 issp Eurydice, http://www.inca.org.uk/ 
Ireland  1972 15 14 9 8 issp Brunello et al (2009), Eurydice 
Italy 1963 14 11 8 5 issp Brunello et al (2009), Eurydice 
Mexico  1993 15 12 9 6 ipumsi Unesco, http://pcmi.ias.edu/ 
Netherlands  1973 16 15 10 9 issp Brunello et al (2009), Eurydice 
Panama 1995 15 15 11 10 ipumsi  www.oei.es, Gaceta Oficial 
Philippines  1987 12 0 6 0 ipumsi Unesco 
Portugal 1986 15 12 9 6 issp Eurydice 
Rwanda 1985 15 13 6 4 ipumsi Unesco 
Slovak Republic 1984 16 15 10 9 issp Eurydice 
Slovenia  1969 14 12 8 6 issp Eurydice 
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Spain  1970 14 12 8 6 issp Brunello et al (2009), Eurydice 
Sweden 1962 16 15 9 8 issp Brunello et al (2009), Eurydice 
Switzerland 1970 15 12 9 6 issp Unesco 
Uruguay  1986 15 12 9 6 issp Unesco 
Venezuela  1980 14 11 9 6 ipumsi Unesco 
Table A.1 Summary of countries considered, reforms and sources used 
 
  Years of schooling 
Country Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Argentina 3614 10.05 3.19 0 17 
Austria 3828 10.35 2.67 0 24 
Belgium 1142 13.44 3.01 0 24 
Brazil 26575 6.04 4.53 0 17 
Canada 25070 13.10 3.05 3 23 
Chile 4893 9.36 4.48 0 18 
Colombia 8197 7.97 4.52 0 17 
Costa Rica 12230 8.20 4.27 0 18 
Cyprus 1031 13.49 2.24 6 20 
Czech Republic 3858 12.86 2.24 4 23 
Denmark  3267 12.76 3.75 6 24 
Ecuador 18263 8.38 5.24 0 18 
Finland 2647 12.43 3.93 0 24 
Germany 4975 10.51 3.25 0 24 
Ghana 5013 5.65 6.29 0 18 
Great Britain 5688 11.86 2.08 6 24 
Greece 5237 10.79 4.16 0 22 
Hungary 235 12.44 2.88 3 22 
Ireland 3923 12.16 3.04 0 24 
Italy 3045 11.21 4.42 0 24 
Mexico 4601 9.49 4.17 0 18 
Netherlands 7314 13.28 3.72 0 24 
Panama 7005 9.75 4.08 0 18 
Philippines 5638 9.39 3.21 0 14 
Portugal 2330 10.45 4.64 0 24 
Rwanda 6592 3.56 3.22 0 18 
Slovak Republic 2177 12.77 2.45 0 23 
Slovenia 5281 11.16 3.09 0 24 
Spain  4406 10.78 4.34 0 24 
Sweden 3917 11.12 3.88 0 24 
Switzerland 4304 11.46 3.21 0 24 
Uruguay 938 10.67 3.99 0 24 
Venezuela 7222 8.29 3.51 0 18 
Table A.2 Summary statistics for years of schooling  
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  (1) (2) (3) 
  
OLS  OLS OLS 
  
2 yrs 
wide 
Countries’ 
effect 
7 yrs 
wide 
Reform 0.14** 0.0529*** 0.187*** 
Reform*at   0.290***   
Reform*be   0.138***   
Reform*bg   0.719***   
Reform*ch   -0.00471   
Reform*cy   0.0927***   
Reform*cz   -0.269***   
Reform*de   0.269***   
Reform*dk   0.0576***   
Reform*es   0.473***   
Reform*fr   0.349***   
Reform*gb   0.162***   
Reform*hu   0.0635***   
Reform*ie   0.530***   
Reform*ita   0.278***   
Reform*nl   0.281***   
Reform*pl   0.130***   
Reform*pt   0.606***   
Reform*ru   0.136***   
Reform*se   0.554***   
Reform*sk   -0.0229***   
Reform*slo   0.111***   
Reform*uy   0.388***   
Reform*ar   -0.697***   
Reform*br   0.190***   
Reform*ca   0.139***   
Reform*cl   0.450***   
Reform*co   0.137***   
Reform*cr   0.0938***   
Reform*ec   0.0686***   
Reform*gh   0.457***   
Reform*gr   0.475***   
Reform*mx   0.0681***   
Reform*pa   -0.432***   
Reform*ph   -0.514***   
Reform*ro   -0.0661***   
Reform*rw   0.201***   
Age      0.0462* 
Age^2    -0.001*** 
Female 0.180** 0.180** 0.118 
White 2.268*** 2.268*** 2.189*** 
Countries fixed effects yes yes yes 
Constant 5.831*** 5.873*** 5.512*** 
Observations 75810 75810 209501 
R-squared 0.343 0.344 0.353 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Table A.3: general and detailed effect of treatment 
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Ranking of countries 
Argentina -0.792 Canada 0.044 
Philippines -0.609 Great Britain 0.067 
Panama -0.527 Brazil 0.095 
Czech Republic -0.364 Rwanda 0.106 
Romania -0.161 Germany 0.174 
Slovak Republic -0.118 Italy 0.183 
Venezuela -0.095 Netherlands 0.186 
Denmark -0.037 Austria 0.195 
Hungary -0.031 France 0.254 
Mexico -0.027 Uruguay 0.293 
Ecuador -0.026 Chile 0.355 
Cyprus -0.002 Ghana 0.362 
Costa Rica -0.001 Spain 0.378 
Slovenia 0.016 Greece 0.380 
Poland 0.035 Ireland 0.435 
Russia 0.041 Sweden 0.459 
Colombia 0.042 Portugal 0.511 
Belgium 0.043 Bulgaria 0.624 
Table A.4: Ranking of countries according to the reforms’ impact 
 
  
Quantile: 
  
10° 25° 50° 75° 90° 
Reform 0** 0.013* 0 0 0 
Female 0*** 0 0 0*** 0*** 
White 2*** 2*** 3*** 3*** 3*** 
Age 0*** -0.18*** 0*** 0*** 0*** 
Age^2 0*** 0.006*** 0 0*** 0* 
Age^3 -0*** -0.00006*** -0 -0*** 0* 
Countries fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 1** 5.8*** 6*** 8*** 9*** 
Observations 211169 211169 211169 211169 211169 
Pseudo R-squared 0.356 0.31 0.2 0.17 0.073 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Table A.5 Simultaneous quantile regression: general effect of the reforms 
 
Marginal effects for the probability of completing primary schooling 
Reform 0.0149*** 
Female 0.00314 
White 0.116*** 
Countries fixed effects yes 
Observations 75810 
Pseudo R-squared 0.291 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table A.6 Probit model for the completion of primary school. 
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2 The effect of schooling on fertility, labor market participation and 
children’s outcomes, evidence from Ecuador 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Using a representative sample of Ecuadorian young women’s households, this paper focuses 
on the role played by education in shaping fertility choices, labor market participation rate and 
future children’s outcomes. Education, which is found to be endogenous with respect to teenage 
childbearing, is instrumented by a reform that took place in 1977. Estimates show that the 
completion of lower secondary school decreases the probability of early motherhood by 7%. Then, 
after controlling for labor market preferences in a model where the choices to be a mother and to be 
in the labor force are considered simultaneously, we find evidence that schooling is positively 
related to women’s labor market participation rate and negatively to early motherhood. The last 
section concludes stressing the potential intergenerational effects of changes in the age at first birth, 
showing that firstborn children born to older mothers have better educational outcomes than those 
born to younger ones. So policies aimed at increasing women educational attainment are found to 
be positively related to better women’s outcomes, expressed by lowered teenage motherhood rate 
and by increased labor market attachment, and also to improved children’s conditions, represented 
by their schooling attendance.  
 
 
2.2 Introduction 
 
This work will consider the effect of education on fertility and on labor market participation 
rate in the case of Ecuador, where fertility rate is high and women average educational level low. 
As a consequence women are unskilled and underpaid or even unemployed. In 1982, 24% of 
teenagers were mothers and on average 19 years old mothers completed less than 6 years of 
schooling, while their non-mothers counterparts 8 years.15 Teenage childbearing is commonly 
associated with subsequent poor mothers’ and children’s outcomes (see for example Ribar, 1999 
and 1994, and Krueger and Berthelon, 2009) and in Ecuador children’s conditions are deprived and 
sometimes miserable. In fact, along with academic works, there is huge evidence that in Ecuador 
investment in human capital is low, especially among poor families. Children drop out of school 
and work in order to increase family income (ILO, 2004). They are exploited in the formal and 
informal labor market, working for a pay which is far below the minimum wage on plantations or in 
farms (ibidem). Governamental commitment to prevent minors’ abuse and exploitation is not 
efficacely pursued and much of the effort for promoting policies in favor of children is left to 
NGOs.  
Graphs of Figures 1 clearly suggest the correlation between education, teen fertility and 
participation in the labor market. Education here expressed in levels (no schooling or some, primary 
completed and some secondary, secondary completed and above) is positively related to 
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 According to 1982 census, data provided by IPUMSI.  
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participation in the labor market rates and inversely to early fertility, proxied by being a mother 
before age 18. 
 
 
Figure 1 Proportion of teenage mothers in 1990 and 1982, by educational level and participation in the 
labor market; source: IPUMSI. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Proportion of women with lower secondary education. Sample of women aged 24-31, in 1982 and 
1990; source IPUMSI. 
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What needs to be uncovered is the causal relation between education and teenage 
motherhood, and if fertility choices affects also the labor market participation and vice versa.   
Since the relationship between education and (early) fertility might be endogenous we exploit 
an exogenous variation in compulsory education to instrument women’s educational attainment.  
The graphs in Figure 2 shows the shift in the educational level associated with the reform.  
In this contex, from a policy perspective, promoting education is relevant because benefits 
from an increased educational attainment include a reduction in fertility rates among teenagers and 
labor opportunities; this in turn will positively affect further future generations, helping to break 
self-sustaining poor conditions. So here we will also stress the importance of schooling on future 
outcomes, exploiting the variation in women educational attainment caused by a reform.  
So a first part will focus on the relationship between teenage motherhood and education, 
which is treated as potentially endogenous. This problem has been solved using an instrumental 
variable approach, by means of a reform of compulsory education that took place in Ecuador in 
1977. Intuitively education can be endogenous to teenage fertility because women with a stronger 
preference for participating in the labor market could simultaneously invest more in education and 
less in children, and vice versa; moreover it’s not clear if the decision to quit school is a cause or an 
effect of fertility decisions, for example if teenagers get pregnant and they drop out of school 
(Glewwe, 2002, and Ribar, 1994). So empirically it’s difficult to estimate the effect of education on 
fertility, because it depends on unobserved characteristics (ability and preferences) that determine 
simultaneously fertility choices and investment in human capital. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and 
Angrist and Krueger (1991) refer to reforms in compulsory education law as to the ideal instrument 
for education.  So education is instrumented and a differences-in-differences approach is applied to 
assess the effects of schooling on early fertility. Education has also been instrumented and found 
negatively related to fertility in the works by Black et al. for the US and Norway (2008), by 
Monstad et al. (2008) for Norway, by León (2004) for US, by Fort (2009) for Italy and by Tayfur et 
al. (2008) for Turkey. Osili and Long (2007) test the efficacy of a different Nigerian policy program 
to boost girls’ schooling on fertility. In this work we won’t use data on completed fertility but we 
could only take into account when young women gave birth for the first time, since all information 
are retrieved from censuses; so, our outcome variable for early fertility will indicate if women got 
their first child before the age of 18. In this study education is found to be endogenous with respect 
to teen motherhood and instrumental variables estimates suggest that education is negatively 
affecting early motherhood, as expected.  
A second part is then dedicated to understanding whether the effect of a higher educational 
level on fertility passes through the labor market, even if there might be also non-market outcomes 
stemming from education (changed values, aspirations and attitude toward childhood). So basically 
in this section we will try to understand why women who get more schooling delay the age at first 
birth, so that education has negative effects on early fertility. Heckman and Walker (1990) showed 
that women wages are negatively related to fertility: more educated women have higher wages, 
delay first conceptions and reduce total number of kids. The idea that will be tested, as in Bratti 
(2003), Happel et al. (1984), is that the increased level of education makes more profitable working 
and thus the opportunity cost of a child rises and their ‘consumption’ falls.  Since the decision to 
have a baby when teenager and to work is interdependent, and education is potentially still 
endogenous a trivariate probit model is considered. In fact a simple regression model where the 
decision to participate on the labor market is regressed against an indicator for teenage fertility can 
be spurious because it’s the result of an interdependent decision where each woman chooses to 
invest in early fertility given her labor market expectations. Results clearly support that education 
while diminishes the probability to be a mother before age 18, increases the probability to be in the 
labor force.  
In the last part we will explore if the age at first birth influences children’s outcomes. Here we 
only have information on current household’s members, so each mother’s fertility timing is 
associated with her children’s reported educational level. The analysis shows that avoiding teenage 
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motherhood has positive effects on children educational outcomes. So there is an indication for 
positive intergenerational effects of schooling, even if the analysis can not show a proper causal 
relation. 
 
 
2.3 Education, fertility and labor market outcomes in the literature 
 
As already mentioned scholars showed that there is a causal relationship that goes from 
maternal education to fertility, passing through labor market. An increase in the schooling level of 
women raises their expected wages and their participation in the labor market as well. This in turn 
cause an upward shift in the opportunity cost of having a baby, expressed in missed wages during 
pregnancy and afterwards (Happel 1984 et al., Heckman and Walker, 1990). On this market 
mechanism we will return later on.  
However, an increase in educational level has an impact on fertility that goes beyond the labor 
market outcomes cited above. There are many channels through which education influences 
reproductive behavior and moreover this relationship is not static over the demographic transition. 
Education improves women’s ability to process information regarding contraceptive technologies, 
healthy behavior (see for example Behrman and Wolfe, 1989) and it strengthens their role inside the 
couple. So here we will briefly review all the non-market outcomes associated with an increased 
schooling level and fertility. 
Glewwe (1999) and Schultz (1993) find that mothers’ education has positive effect on the 
health status of their offspring so that child mortality is reduced. Chou et al. (2007) find evidence of 
decreasing child mortality with increasing parents’ educational level, instrumented with a reform on 
compulsory education in Taiwan. A recent work by Krueger and Berthelohn (2009) analyzes the 
effect of a school reform that increased hours spent in school in Chile and show that teen 
motherhood is reduced by access to full-day education. Note that increased education does not 
always imply a reduction in fertility rates; in fact in a country at the beginning of the demographic 
transition, education can be associated with an increase in the number of children, because of their 
health improvement and higher survival rate.16 Notwithstanding, empirical analysis, as in Schultz 
(1993), finds that when infant mortality goes down also fertility is reduced because there is a 
quality/quantity trade off (consistently with Becker and Lewis, 1973). In fact, education is 
associated with an increase in the number of children if fertility is not controlled, but as soon as it 
gets fully controlled and desired family size is smaller than the actual one, those aforementioned 
effects boosting fertility are offset by the use of contraceptives. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985), 
Rosenzweig and Seiver (1982), Ainsworth et al. (1996), Florez and Nuñez (2002) provide evidence 
that education have a positive effect on the use of contraceptives. 
Even if birth controls methods are diffused and relatively cheap, husband disapproval can 
hamper women to use them, as shown by Kamal (2000) in a study on Bangladesh. So another 
important aspect that is taken into account is if education affects the decision making processes 
inside the family in favor of the women. In the works done by Jejeeboy (1995), women are shown 
to have a stronger role in family planning and more bargaining power within the household, the 
more they are educated. Moreover, cultural values, beliefs and tradition play an important role in 
shaping desired family size, and it has been shown that whenever they are modified there is a 
response in the fertility rates. So the availability of contraception by itself is not a sufficient 
condition for reducing the number of children (La Ferrara et al., 2008, study how values diffused by 
a soap opera reduced the desired family size Brazil).  
Women’s education does not only affect women’s attitude toward fertility decisions, but it has 
been shown to influence also children’s outcomes other than their survival rate.  
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 And also as shown in Bratti (2003) for developed countries, for high level of education the relationship turns positive, 
because high-income women have access to childcare. 
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If mothers’ education makes less expensive to spend time with children in terms of effort (as 
shown by Black et al., 2005) and it there is a tradeoff between quality and quantity of children, 
improvement in parental education is transmitted to their offspring (Glewwe 2002, Hanushek, 
1992). Rosenzweig (1990) shows empirically that when investment in children’s human capital is 
higher than the number of children is lower, sustaining the hypothesis of an underlying trade off. 
Francesconi (2008) and Ribar (1999, 1994) show that children born to teenage mothers have 
worse outcomes in terms of education, earnings, health and inactivity. Hunt (2003) analyzing US 
finds that people born to teenage mothers are more likely to be criminals, because of their deprived 
childhood.  Levine and Painter (2003) find that teenagers out of wedlock mothers in US have lower 
education than peers that have children later on. This is manly due to preexisting disadvantages and 
not to the birth itself, nevertheless the estimates indicate that the persistence of those disadvantage 
is due to becoming mother when teen. Black et al (2005) find instead limited support for 
intergenerational effects between educational level of parents and their offsprings, while in another 
paper (2008) they find that education delays teenage childbearing and this attitude is transmitted to 
their children (in Norway and US). McCrary and Royer (2009) instead find that in California and 
Texas the effect of mothers’ education on timing of fertility and children’s health is not significant. 
 On developing countries many studies concentrate on health problems of children born to 
teenagers (Woldemicael for Eritrea, 2005, LeGrand et al. for Sahel region, 1993, Florez and Nun ez 
for six Latin American countries, 2003) and results are clearer than those of developed countries. In 
Indonesia mothers’ and fathers’ increased educational level plays a role in decreasing the number of 
early births and in increasing children health, as showed by Duflo and Breierova (2004). Overall 
there is the common agreement that too young mothers are more prone to invest less in their 
children than older mothers with respect to both education and health. This fact is particularly 
severe in countries where poverty is widespread so that children are subject to high mortality and 
morbidity rates. So mothers’ education can have an impact on children’s well being through 
delaying early pregnancies.  
 
While for developing countries scholars study the effect of education and fertility on human 
capital outcomes and only marginally on labor market perspectives, for developed countries most of 
the current research is focused on the latter in a dynamic perspective and, in particular, on how 
women emancipation causes a postponement of fertility and generally its decline.17 In this work the 
issue is not fertility postponement, but to see if education can promote more equal conditions for 
women and more investment in human capital, which is commonly viewed as a crucial goal to be 
pursued for growth.  
The contributions to theoretical models of fertility stem from two streams of literature: one in 
which Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973) stress the importance of the cost of raising a 
child and earning potential, proxied respectively by female wages and family income. Becker 
(1960) finds that the elasticity of demand for children quality to income is larger than the elasticity 
of demand for children quantity. Heckman and Walker (1990) estimate a reduced-form neoclassical 
life cycle model for fertility in which lower fertility rates and a delayed times to all conceptions are 
associated to higher female wages. In an empirical model Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) point 
out that assortative mating effect amplifies the income effect of an increased educational level on 
children quantity, because more educated women chose more educated partners further increasing 
the household’s income.  
On the other hand, Easterlin (1966) proposed a model where changes in relative cohort size 
affect fertility through their impact on relative income. The idea is that after baby booms there are 
‘crowding mechanisms’ in families, schools and labor market that deteriorate a cohort income 
expectations with respect to their parents’. This leads to downward revision of opportunities, that 
cause reduction in fertility rates and an increase in female labor force participation, as the young 
                                                 
17
 With the exception of Italy, where participation in the labor market rate is still relatively low but at the same time 
fertility rates are one of the lowest among European countries (see Di Tommaso, 1999).  
A. De Paoli – Essays on education reforms  Chapter 2 
 29 
cohort tries to maintain their relative economic status (there is the underlying hypothesis that each 
cohort tends to keep the status in which it grew up). Jeon and Shields (2008) test this relationship in 
a cointegrated model on US and find general support for the Easterlin hypothesis. Macunovich 
(2000) extends the analyses to developing countries and shed some light on a phase of the 
demographic transition where fertility control becomes accepted and so trade off between quantity 
and quality of children takes place. 
Many scholars test empirically life cycle models of fertility where education plays a crucial 
role in explaining both fertility quantum and/or tempo. In these models children enter the utility 
function of a household together with other consumption goods. The price associated to children are 
expressed by the time spent with the child, which is generally the opportunity cost represented by 
female wages, the direct cost of rearing a child and the investments in human capital that a 
household forgoes (Walker 1995).  
Gustaffson (2001) reviews many empirical contributions to the fertility patterns observed in 
Europe. He points out that the main factor driving the slow down of the observed population growth 
is the women’s career costs: those include the wage loss and the lower human capital investment 
caused by time spent out of work.18 
 
 
2.4 Women’s education and teenage motherhood 
 
2.4.1 The effect of the reform on educational attainment 
Here we will take into account the effect of education on risk of being a teen mother, 
exploiting the variation caused by the reform on compulsory schooling, given the potential 
endogeneity of education on fertility decisions. Before explaining the effects of education on 
fertility we will concentrate on first stage schooling equation, then after some considerations about 
the effect of the reform on educational level we will use the instrumented education in a fertility 
equation. 
Schooling is endogenous to fertility if there are some unobservable women’s characteristics 
that are correlated with both the investment in education and fertility decisions, like strong labor 
market preferences; in fact if a woman wants to be in the labor force she will invest more in 
education and less in fertility. The reform that will be taken into account to instrument education is 
a law passed in 1977 (Ley de Educación y Cultura) that extended compulsory education from six 
years to nine years, making it freely available to all.19 Education before 1977 was compulsory until 
age 12, so that this law extended compulsory education by 3 years: from age 12 to age 15.  
Data are taken from 1982 and 1990 censuses, provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Censos, and harmonized by IPUMSI and contain information on households’ composition and on 
the dwellings’ general characteristics. Therefore we can link each woman present in the sample to 
her children and to all the people currently living in the household. Unfortunately it’s not possible 
to keep track of those family members that had left the household (for example children when 
grown up). So data provide two kinds of information: a) on the house’s status: number of rooms, 
availability of the kitchen, phone line, sewage system, water supply, and b) on individuals that live 
in: parental rule, link to household head, age, sex, province of birth, place of residence, educational 
level, employment status and occupation. 
The analysis follows a differences-in-differences framework, so that women in the sample are 
divided into four groups. We know that the reform took place in 1977 and we have data from two 
census years, 1982 and 1990. Women that were younger than 27 years old in 1990 were targeted by 
the reform (treated group), as they were 14 years old or younger in 1977. Since people could have 
started school late when child and/or repeated a grade, we include in the treated group women that 
were older than 12. Instead those women that in 1977 were older than 14 were not involved by the 
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 See also Gustaffson and Wetzel (2000). 
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 http://www.tau.ac.il/eial/X_1/ossenbach.html 
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reform and form the not treated group. Since there might be secular trends that could increase 
schooling even without the reform, computing just the differences in educational attainment 
between these two cohorts is not sufficient to infer reform efficacy. To get rid of this possible 
growing trend, we include in the regression two more groups of women: those that were older and 
younger than 27 in 1982, mimicking the same reasoning as above, and then we control for age. In 
this way assuming that the trend if present is constant (i.e. the only thing that happened is the 
reform) we can be sure that what increased educational level was the reform. Note that this is a 
standard assumption in every study that makes use of difference-in-differences technique. Each 
group here defined is four-year wide: so the treated includes women aged from 24 to 27, not treated 
from 28 to 31 (for both the censuses year).  The figure below reassumes the setting used for the 
analysis according to the description just given.   
 
 
 Figure 3: scheme used in the DID structure; in bold the age groups considered, in red the cohort affected by 
reform 
 
 We analyze the effect of compulsory schooling reform on different educational outcomes 
but the DID scheme remains the same, so as the other regressors. 
The explanatory variables include two sets of regressors: those that have the purpose to 
instrument education, vector zi, and those that will be used also in the fertility and in the labor 
regression (xi and wi variables).  
So the instruments zi include: a dummy variable for the reform, equal to 1 if women are in the 
treated group, and equal to 0 otherwise; the share of the number of teachers per in each canton in 
each census year (the canton is the smallest territorial unit of analysis) and the average level of 
education of people older than 28 in each canton and census year; this last variable aims to capture 
the ‘socio-cultural environment’ in which each women live in and that could potentially influence 
women educational attainment. We include only educational attainment of people older than 28 to 
prevent the reform having influences on that group’s schooling level. The share of teachers, which 
includes teachers of any type of school, is a ratio on the school aged population and proxies the 
amount of resources available for education.20  
 
AGE RANGES 
 28-31 in 1982 24-27 in 1982 28-31 in 1990 24-27 in 1990 
REFORM  0 0 0 1 
TREND 0 0 1 1 
Table 2: scheme for the dummy variables setting used in the DID framework. 
 
Then we have two groups of variables: the first one is meant to control for factor that are 
related to fertility, while the last one includes generic controls. The xi group of variables includes: a 
dummy variable controlling for the trend which is equal to 1 for people were surveyed in the 1990 
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 A further distinction between teachers in elementary, secondary and tertiary education does not improve the 
estimation results.  
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census year and equal to 0 otherwise; the share of married woman in the canton in each census 
year;21 the share of doctors and nurse in each canton, in each census year. This can control for the 
fact that where the density of doctors is higher information about contraceptive methods are easier 
to acquire. Then there is the wi group of variablest: age; a household wealth index built with partial 
correlation analysis that contains information on the socio-economic conditions of the household 
and on the household’s assets;22 a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman live in Quito or 
Guayaquil, the two biggest cities in Ecuador (this controls for the fact that living in a big city can 
increase educational opportunities)23.  
Summary statistics of all the variables are in Table 1, in the Appendix.  
So the aim of this first stage regression is to see the effect of the compulsory school reform on 
education and this is carried out according different specifications. Since the age of the women in 
the sample could have an impact on the completion of the highest level of education, thus 
confounding the effect of the reform, years of schooling are censored at 13 (this correspond to some 
tertiary education or more). The educational outcome is  is represented by years of education 
(censored at 13), by the educational attainment expressed in levels  (no schooling, some primary, 
primary completed, lower secondary, secondary and some tertiary or above), or by the completion 
of lower secondary school, as follows: 
iiiioi wxzs εββββ ++++= 3'2'1         (1) 
where is is modeled with a Tobit model, with a multinomial logit and with a probit models 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at canton level, allowing for spatial correlation. The error 
term iε  is assumed to be independent from the reform, conditional on all the other covariates. 
According to the reform setting one should expect a significant effect of the reform on the 
probability of completing lower secondary education, otherwise the reform impact would be 
confused with a general expansion of educational attainments. So first is performed a standard least 
square model in which the years of schooling are regressed against the variables listed before 
(column 1, Table 2a in the Appendix) and the reform had no effects. In this model two problems are 
ignored: we are including outliers with high leverage and we are ignoring the fact that the variable 
is censored. So performing a Tobit model on the same sample (column (2)) we get better results but 
still the reform is not significant. In the subsequent regression (column (3)) is then reported the 
results of the Tobit model excluding the outliers.24 Here we see that the reform increased the 
educational attainment of women for which education is observed in the interval [0,13] by 0,1 
years. Also a probit model, that estimate the probability of completing lower secondary school, 
confirms that the reform was effective in making people staying at school for 9 years (results in 
column (4)). The reform increased the probability of completing lower secondary school by 1,5%. 
Note that focusing on the precise target of the reform is a strategy that also was followed by Meghir 
and Palme (2005), in their study about the effect of a reform in Sweden.   
To get further details on the effect of the reform on its specific target, we perform a 
multinomial logit model on each level, and results are reported in columns (1) to (6) of Table 2b. 
The result clearly shows that the reform increased only the probability of completing lower 
secondary education and then, since the marginal effect is equal to 0,0127, that the reform increased 
                                                 
21
 Controlling for each woman marital status can potentially bias the estimation, since it’s not clear if marriage is a 
consequence of a cause of pregnancy. In this way we have a more indirect measure of marital status.  So this variable is 
meant to capture social norms that influences women’s fertility behavior. 
22
 The variables included here are: the availability of electricity, of sewage system, of water supply, of kitchen, of toilet 
and number of rooms per person, similarly to what La Ferrara et al. (2008) do. Since these variable are discrete it has 
been used polychoric partial correlation analysis, following Kolenikov and Angeles (2004).  
23
 It would have been better to control for residence in urban/rural area, but unfortunately this information is not 
available for ther 1982 sample. 
24
 Only less than 3% of the observations is lost. Further investigations about the possible reasons why those 
observations should be excluded revealed that for most f them there were errors and mismatches (i.e. years of education 
that are not comparable with the declared educational attainment, no clear household’s structure, etc…) 
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years of education by 0,114.25 So all the models agree on the sign and on the magnitude of the 
effect of the reform. The standard assumption of Indipendence of Irrelevant Alternatives has been 
tested on the multinomial model with the Small-Hsiao test (Small and Hsiao, 1985) and it holds (see 
Table 3 in the Appendix).  
One possible confounding factor would be if along with the reform other events that 
influences schooling attendance took place. In Ecuador different military dictatorships had been in 
power from the beginning of the sixties until 1979, when democratic elections were held, after a 
period of state-lead modernization and growing foreign debt. After that year governments were 
unable to promote serious structural reforms, so that poverty and unemployment condition 
worsened, with increasing popular discontent (The Economist Intelligence Unit, various years). So 
the political context was unstable, even if it didn’t end up in guerrilla or severe violence episodes. 
According to the information available there is no reason to believe that the end of dictatorship 
caused an increase in educational attainment, since the country’s general conditions worsened. So at 
most the effect of the reform is downward biased.  
Since the next step will be to explore the relationship between education and fertility, an 
important notice should be made here: to be sure that the reform does not have a direct effect on 
fertility we check that the reform did not reduce the occurrence of early pregnancies. Even if it’s 
very unlikely that a young girl gets pregnant before the end of lower secondary school, we run a 
probit regression to check if the probability to have a baby before 15 years old is influenced directly 
by the reform. The setting used to control for this effect is identical to the one used previously for 
the schooling equations and results confirm that there is no ‘incarceration’ effect of the reform on 
early fertility.26  Moreover none of the zi, variables has a direct impact on early fertility (see results 
in Table 4, column (1)). 
 Since the age of first pregnancy that will be modeled in the next section is inferred by the age 
of the oldest child living with the mother, one concern might be the loss of information about 
children that had been abandoned or that start their own family soon in the lifetime. It’s reassuring 
that, if education promotes investment and care for children, more educated mothers do separate 
from their young children less frequently, so that the coefficient of education in the second stage 
equation will be at most downward bias (if the probability to be abandoned is decreasing with 
education). Nevertheless it would be better not to compare women aged too differently, since data 
confirm that the probability to live without a mother is increasing with age (so a 17 years old 
individual is more likely to live without her own mother than a 12 years old). According to the 
setting depicted above we would have to compare the age of first pregnancy of a cohort 8 years 
wide, which might blur the effect of education on teenage motherhood, if children start living alone 
or even their own family soon in their lifetime. In order to avoid this problem we could exclude 
older cohorts and just focus on women aged 24, 25, 26 and 27, in the two census years, provided 
there is no trend going over between the two censuses in both schooling and fertility choices. 
Inferring the age of first pregnancy by using information about 27 years old women can be done 
safely, because analyzing average age of children in each household we discover that it drops from 
18 years old onward. This is telling that on average children live with parents until they reach age 
18 and thus women aged 27 should be still leaving whit their first born children which can be at 
most 15 (assuming that pregnancies before age 12 are very unlikely).27 Before doing that we have to 
check that there is no trend going over between the two censuses. 
Education is not increasing in time between the two censuses in every specifications of Tables 
2a (see the marginal effect of the variable for the 1990 Census) and in Table 2b time effect is close 
                                                 
25
 Since the comparison category is no schooling, the effect of the reform expressed in years is equal to: 
0127,09114,0 ⋅= . Nine here refers to the years that are necessary to complete lower secondary education.  
26
 Black et al. (2008) and Krueger and Berthelon (2009) show that spending more time at school reduces the time 
available to be involved in risky behavior, thus lowering early motherhood rate. 
27
 The Statistical Office providing the census states that a woman can be considered a mother from the age of 12. So 
children born before that age are not considered as her own children. 
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to zero or negative. Splitting the sample into young (24-27 years old) and old women (28-31), we 
see that time variation occurs only when comparing the two groups of young women (Table 4, 
column (3)), while there is no increase in educational attainment if one looks only at the comparison 
between the two groups formed by older women (column (2)). 
 So, from now on we use only the sample composed by women aged 24-27, because we can 
reasonably assume that the only thing that affected education was the reform.28 In this way the 
effect of schooling will be on a same aged group of women, so that the further study on teenage 
motherhood is not biased because of age.  
Results of the Tobit regression on the sample of young women confirm the efficacy of the 
reform and years of schooling are increased by 2,8% (Column (3) of Table 4).29 So the reform can 
be used to instrument education in a fertility equation.  
 
2.4.2 The effect of education on teenage fertility 
The model that will be presented here will try to analyze the effects of education on each 
woman’s probability to become a teenage mother. The age at which each woman gave birth for the 
first time is derived from the age of the eldest own child living in the household and it is used to 
build the binary variable for teenage motherhood. Also Francesconi (2008) and Ribar (1999) use a 
dichotomous model for teenage fertility, but consider adolescent childbearing until the age of 20. 
This threshold is not appropriate for a developing country such as Ecuador at the time considered, 
and in fact in this study, teenage motherhood is defined until 18 years old. So the sample of women 
is divided into those that become mother before age 18 and those that didn’t and so a probit model 
is considered.  
The probability of being a teenage mother iT  is modeled as follows:  
iiiii wxsT ηββγβ ++++=∗ 3'2'1       (6) 
where 1=iT  if 0>
∗
iT , and  0=iT otherwise; 
∗
iT is normalized to 0 without consequences, 
since the equation  includes an intercept.  
We run a fist regression in which education is not instrumented (see column (1) in Table 5) 
and the completion of lower secondary education is  is negatively associated with teenage fertility, 
as expected. This simple model does not take into account that education might be endogenous, so 
we run a two-stage fertility equation where education is instrumented with the zi variables, as 
explained in the previous paragraph. Even if years of schooling might be a more accurate measure 
for education, here a binary variable for lower secondary attainment is preferred: first of all because 
it’s the precise target of the reform that is used as instrument, and secondly because it’s easier to 
interpret the results, as years of schooling are censored and a Tobit model in the first stage would be 
needed. In this last case the computation would be burdensome and results not so easy to interpret, 
as we would have to consider also the probability of having education censored at 13.   
So we run a first stage probit equation for schooling followed by a second stage probit 
equation for teenage motherhood, according the following framework.  
In the first stage equation for schooling is is the probability to complete lower secondary 
education and 1=is  if 0>
∗
is , and 0=is otherwise:  
iiiii wxzs εβββ +++= 3'2'1'*  
and then we have equation (6) for being a teenage mother as second stage. 
Let’s define:   
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 The trend is not even significant for fertility decisions once accounted for the effect of education. 
29
 The partial R2 of the regression of completion of primary schooling on the instruments is equal to 0,08.  
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so that the joint error term )',( iiiv ηε= ~ ),0( Σ=N , where 





=Σ
1
1
ρ
ρ
and ρ  measures the 
endogeneity of schooling is in the fertility equation. If 0=ρ then the relationship is not endogenous.  
The resulting likelihood function that has to be maximized can be written as:  
),)',((),,|,;,,,( 2121 Σ−−Φ= iiiiiiii wxzTsL ϑϑργββ     (7)   
This function is maximized as a bivariate probit. 
Results are reported in Table 5: column (2) shows the marginal effects for the final fertility 
equation, while in column (3) are reported marginal effects for the first stage schooling equation. 
Completing lower secondary education decrease the probability of being a teenage mother by 
7,07%, meaning that education has a role in postponing early pregnancies. 
ρ is statistically significant and negative, meaning that there is a latent factor that increases 
the probability to complete lower secondary schooling and decreases the probability of being a 
teenage mother (or viceversa), as expected.30 So this model is appropriate and education can not be 
considered exogenous with respect to adolescent childbearing.  
So the reform considered here, causing an increase in schooling level, decreases the 
probability of early motherhood. Since having children when adolescent could negatively affect 
their future development, this policy can be thought as a tool to promote education on the current 
generation with potential effects on the next one and this aspect will be explored in the last section.  
Here one possible confounding factor would be if along with the reform there were significant 
changes in the availability of contraceptives. According to what we are aware of, we can not assume 
that there were dramatic changes in the birth controls used by Ecuadorian women caused by 
exogenous shocks, such as massive family planning campaigns that in fact in those years were 
reported as ‘weak’; so the use of contraceptives relies on women educational level and not on their 
availability (Weinberger et al., 1989, and Lapham and Mauldin, 1984). However, this would be 
properly controlled for if we had information about women family planning choices that instead 
here we can only assume. Other information such as each woman desired family size or her parental 
background (in terms of both education and fertility history) would surely increase the power of the 
model, but the data set available is very limited.  
To gain further details into the effects of education on fertility we have to find out the reasons 
why women decide not to become teenage mothers, including in the analysis the labor market. 
Since the decision of having a baby and of working can be interdependent, the specification should 
take into account the simultaneity problem.  
 
2.5 Education, fertility and labor market participation 
 
As previously reviewed, there could be many channels through which education can affect the 
fertility choices. What we can measure with the available data is whether a more skilled woman 
participates in the labor market more frequently than a less educated.  
So here it will be tested if a shock on the educational system has an effect on both the labor 
market participation rate and on teenage fertility, taking these decisions as interdependent. Several 
methods have been used before for this purpose: Ekert-Jaffe and Stier (2009) and Colombino and 
Di Tommaso (1996) use a bivariate probit model; Di Tommaso and Weeks (2000) and Bratti, 
(2003) a multinomial; Di Tommaso (1999) a trivariate model.   
Alternatively one can instrument fertility in order to establish a causal relationship on female 
labor supply, as Cruces and Galiani (2007) do for Mexico and Argentina, following what Angrist 
and Evans (1998) do for US. Aguero and Marks (2008) instead, using as instrument for number of 
children infertility problems, find no effect of fertility on labor market participation for six Latin 
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 Note that if endogeneity problem is not taken into account and a standard probit model is considered (column (1)), the 
resulting schooling coefficient is bigger. This means that the effect of education would have been overestimated.  
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American countries. Piras and Ripani (2005) analyze the effect of motherhood on wages and results 
are mixed, meaning that for some Latin American countries there is a wage premium associated to 
motherhood. Here we won’t test any effect on wages because this information is not available and 
moreover because we would exclude all the non-working women, which are half of the sample.  
In this study the focus will be the role of education in changing women’s probability to give 
birth before age 18 and then both education and teenage motherhood are considered to estimate 
labor supply. Our main concern is that teen pregnancy and labor market participation are 
interdependent and that education is potentially endogenous with respect to fertility and to labor 
supply. So we will use a framework that allows interdependence among the three choices. 
Each woman in the sample first decides to complete lower secondary education and we 
showed that the 1977 law positively affects this educational attainment. So the schooling level, 
instrumented by the reform, is used in a early fertility equation and found negatively correlated with 
adolescent motherhood; we interpret this relationship as causal, since education was instrumented 
with an exogenous shock. In this part we want to explore one of the possible reasons why more 
educated women do not become mothers when teenager, that is if women with strong labor market 
preferences invest more in education and less in fertility. Since the data give information about the 
current employment status and don’t contain information on working starting age, we analyze if 
fertility and education decisions taken in the past influence labor market participation at present. So 
the labor market participation equation is modeled as follows:  
iiiiiii wTsL ιϑιβδγ +=+++=∗ 33'        (8) 
and 1=iL  if 0>
∗
iL , and 0=iL otherwise. The equation for labor market participation 
includes the dummy for lower secondary attainment (si) and the dummy for teenage motherhood 
(Ti). The xi group of variables is not included here, since it only controls for characteristics that 
affect fertility decision, and are exclusion restrictions. So to the bivariate model explained in the 
previous section is added the labor equation, and the three equations are estimated simultaneously 
in a trivariate probit model framework. We choose not to estimate separately equation (8) because 
potentially there could be factors that are correlated with both early fertility and labor market 
participation, and with education and labor market participation. Since teenage fertility is defined 
early in the life cycle with respect to participation in the labor market (because of the data 
available), we choose to consider early fertility in the labor equation and not vice versa. Di 
Tommaso (1999) uses a trivariate model as well, but she includes a (predicted) wage equation, 
rather then a schooling equation. Here wages are not available, and the best predictor for wage in 
this context is in fact education.  
We assume that the error terms iii ιηε ,, are distributed as a multivariate normal, with mean of 
zero and a variance-covariance matrix V with unitary variance and symmetric. The likelihood 
function that is maximized is the following:  
),)',,((),,|,,;,,,,,( 321321 VwxzLTsL iiiiiiiiii ϑϑϑτδγβββ −−−Φ=  
and the variance-covariance matrix is 
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V , where kjjk ττ = .  
The results of the trivariate model are shown in Table 6 in the Appendix.  
Completing lower secondary schooling increases the probability to participate in the labor 
market by 35% and at the same time decreases the probability to be a teenage mother by 5,3%. The 
direct effect of teenage fertility on labor supply is negative and equal to 31%. Education has a 
stronger impact on the decision to participate in the labor market, as it can be seen as a proxy for 
expected wages.  
The effect of education on teenage fertility is less strong than in the previous model, because 
here also labor market is considered and the two equations are positively related. In fact if we look 
at the estimated correlations, the taus, we see that there is a latent factor not captured by the model 
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that affects positively labor participation and negatively education; even if it might be counter-
intuitive there could be cases of very low income where education is discouraged but at the same 
time labor supply necessary, and there are surely jobs for which education is not needed at all; or on 
the contrary high income women are well educated but don’t need to work in order to survive. 
These two effects, also combined, help explaining why the tau between education and labor 
equation is negative. The same reasoning could be followed when interpreting the fact that also 
there is a latent factor that increases both teen fertility and labor market participation. Low income 
could prevent women to use birth controls, and at the same could force them to supply labor.31 
Moreover, women in the sample are 24-27 years old and teenage fertility is limited to having a baby 
before 18: so teenage fertility cannot rule out completely labor market participation.  
The correlation between the errors of the fertility and education equations has instead the 
expected sign, since education and teen fertility are always negatively correlated. We could not 
think of a hidden characteristic that could promote early fertility and education. Sometimes the 
relationship between education and fertility is inversely U-shaped, when for high-income level 
women fertility rates are high, because they can afford child care services. In this case we are only 
estimating the probability to become mother before age 18, and education can not be reasonably 
positively related to adolescent motherhood. Following the interpretation of Walker (1995) there are 
women that have high discount rate and receive utility from their child so that they have children 
early in the life time and forgo education. On the other hand, when the intertemporal discount rate is 
lower, children’s ‘opportunity cost’ is high, so women delay their ‘consumption’ in order to get 
educated and participate in the labor market.   
To sum up, we see that women with strong labor market preferences tend to invest more in 
education and less in (early) fertility. We don’t know what are the fertility patterns for women when 
older, it might be the case that completed fertility levels would be the same for more and less 
educated women. In this context we only observe that the investment in education and not in 
adolescent motherhood are positively related to labor supply.  
We could in principle give more complete results if we could use more detailed information 
about religion and about the ethnicity of people, but unfortunately those information are not 
collected. Also it would be relevant to know at what age the women in the sample were conceived, 
in order to test if there is intergenerational transmission of fertility behavior and if so this could be a 
stronger instrument for early fertility. In general any information about the original family would 
help to give more precise estimates, but with census data this is not possible, since the majority of 
women involved in the analysis are not living with their parents anymore.  
Another aspect that is not taken into account is the kind of job: we don’t know if the working 
woman is exploited in some informal labor market or if she has a fair wage. Promoting education 
because it generates skilled human capital and encourages female labor market participation would 
be pointless if all better educated women just end up exploited. So this model could be improved in 
various ways conditional on having more information about each household’s characteristics. 
Anyway, the results obtained here are reasonable and consistent with standard interpretations.  
 
 
2.6 Mothers’ education, fertility and children’s outcomes 
 
The first empirical model presented in this work shows how women’s educational attainment, 
increased by a compulsory schooling reform, delays fertility. From a policy perspective it’s 
interesting to see whether these effects on women influence their children’s outcomes. So the 
purpose here is to investigate the intergenerational effect of a postponement of first pregnancy on 
each woman children’s educational attainment. Since universal education is a goal pursued by many 
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 This interpretation helps explaining why the marginal effects for schooling on fertility is lower than in the previous 
model, some women even with low education can decide not to have a baby when teenagers because they have to work. 
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policies, it’s relevant to understand if benefits of an increased educational level spill over on future 
generations.  
Various papers in the literature showed the positive effects of avoiding early pregnancies on 
children education, morbidity and mortality as already reviewed. While for developed countries the 
evidence is sometimes limited and not significant, for developing countries benefits of parents’ 
educational attainment on children outcomes are less blurred and definitely positive. So campaigns 
encouraging women’s education by the World Bank or the UN for example find their support.32  
In this framework we want to explore if the delaying of early motherhood increases mothers’ 
investment in their offspring, measured by years of schooling. Here we can not properly study the 
channel through which older mothers make their children attend school more frequently with 
respect to younger ones, because we don’t have any kind of information about mothers’ attitude 
towards their child. As a first attempt, we simply refer to changes in children’s education associated 
with variation in mothers’ age at first birth, so to get some insights about the sign of the correlation 
between mothers’ age at birth and children’s educational outcomes.  
From the 1990 census data we retrieve information on all households’ members and we can 
regress years of schooling of children against their mothers’ age when at birth, so to observe if kids 
born to older mothers have better educational attainment with respect to those born to younger ones. 
Given that education is increasing with age, the dependent variable considered here refers to an 
index that counts years of school on schooling age as follows:  
6−
=
i
i
i
age
edu
index  
where edui indicates years of education of child i. This index is bounded between 0 and 1, 
where 1 means that a child has the maximum possible level of schooling given his age.  
This model is estimated with ordinary least square and mothers’ age at first birth is also 
interacted with a dummy indicating if the mother is in the labor force or not:  
iiki
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0 )(      (5) 
where Ai is mother age at birth, Li is a dummy variable indicating if each child’s mother is in 
the labor force or not and  Ci is a matrix of other controls for child’s family characteristics; Ci 
includes: sex, siblings currently living in the household, siblings younger than 5, number of family 
members (and its square to capture crowding effects), a dummy that indicates if the father lives in 
the same household or not, the educational level of the household’s head, the number of teachers 
relative to school age people, a wealth index, a dummy for living in rural or urban area and controls 
for province of birth.  
This first part includes two samples: first we see the effect of mother’s age at first birth on the 
sample of firstborns and then the analysis is extended to the whole sample of children living with 
the mother. In both cases we include in the sample kids from age 7 to age 17.  
So Ai is child i mother’s age at birth and in the first estimation (columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 
in the Appendix) K is equal to 26. This choice takes into account that mothers aged 34 and over 
could have children that already left the household, since in Ecuador, as shown at the beginning, on 
average people leave his parents’ house at 18. So until age 33 we can assume that the eldest child in 
the household is actually the first born. Note that we can count schooling years only of people aged 
7 and over (which is exactly why we choose age 26 as the maximum mother’s age at first birth). 
Moreover, we exclude from the sample all the households where the declared number of children 
and the children that are currently living in the household diverge.33 The results confirm that when a 
woman decides to postpone her first birth, there are positive effects on the educational outcome of 
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 See also the review by Strauss and Thomas (1995).   
33
 Note that even if kids leave their parental home on average when 18, there are cases of younger people living without 
a mother. This takes also into account children that did not survived, so that we exclude from the sample those 
households where the following equation is not satisfied: declared_children = children_counted + children_not_alive. 
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the firstborn. This effect reasonably becomes significant if childbearing is delayed from age 17 
onwards, while after age 20 it flattens.34 This is also consistent with our model for fertility, since we 
model the probability to become mother before age 18, considering that after that threshold 
problems related with teen fertility fade out. The explanation that lies behind this result is that 
women postpone their first birth so to invest more in their children. But here the two things are not 
causally linked. 
In the second case (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 in the Appendix) the same analysis is 
performed over the full sample children present in the census, so we include all households without 
caring if there are children that already moved away. So here K is equal to 42, assuming that from 
49 years old onwards it’s very unlikely to give birth. The pattern of the coefficients attached to 
mother’s age at birth is very similar to the one in the previous ‘restricted’ sample, with the 
exception that here there is a decline for the children born after age 30. This slightly fading effect 
could be explained with the fact that children conceived at that mothers’ age are likely not to be 
firstborns and the presence of siblings might be negatively correlated with educational attainment.35  
In each of the two cases, the effect of mothers’ age at birth is interacted with labor market 
participation. While in the first case the coefficient attached to mother’s age at first birth is bigger 
when working mothers’ effect is excluded, in the second one it is the opposite, but in the two cases 
this difference is not significantly different from zero.36 The interpretation lies in the fact that it can 
be the case that working mothers have less control over their firstborns, with respect to non-working 
mothers, so that they tend to go to school less with respect to the more controlled ones of non-
working mothers; however, when all children are considered probably a wage effect offsets the loss 
of control that working mothers can provide; we assume that in this full-sample case children of 
non-working mothers have to provide some income to the family and so that their schooling index 
is lower. Other explanations could be possible but we don’t have enough information to provide 
more details and moreover the difference between working and non-working mothers is small and 
not significant. The graphs below (Figures 4 and 5) represent the coefficients of mother age at birth 
obtained by the estimation (complete results in the Appendix).  
 
 
                                                 
34
 The sudden drop at age 26 is not statistically significant and caused by the fact this age group is too small.  
35
 80% of the children born after age 30 have 2 siblings or more.  
36
 All the coefficients of the interaction between age and labor market participation are positive but not statistically 
different from zero.  
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Figure 1 Estimated coefficients of mothers’ age at birth on firstborns education index 
 
 
The other variables included in the estimation have the expected sign, with the exception of 
the presence of the father that is always positive by never statistically significant. That probably is 
due to the fact the fathers are present in the household in most cases and moreover their effect is 
already captured by their educational level variable.  
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Figure 2 Estimated coefficients of mothers’ age at birth on children’s education index 
 
 
This set of results confirms that there are positive effects on children outcomes if motherhood 
is shifted away from early adolescence: in fact in both cases the coefficient attached to age at first 
birth becomes significant after age 17 and grows until age 20. So for example giving birth at age 20 
rather then at age 12 increases children educational level by 10%, no matter their current grade.  
This suggests that avoiding early childbearing is an important policy aim in order to promote 
children enrollment and literacy. Of course other information are needed if we want to generalize 
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this result to long run effects of teenage motherhood, such as the completed educational attainment 
of teenage mothers’ children when adult.  
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
This work sheds some light on the effects of a reform of mandatory education on women 
fertility choices, labor market participation rates and their children outcomes. Education is found to 
be endogenous with respect to fertility behavior and so it has been instrumented with a reform that 
increased women’s probability of completing lower secondary schooling.  
The results confirm that completion of lower secondary schooling affects women’s risk of 
being teenage mothers and labor supply. Age at first birth is delayed after adolescence for more 
educated women and to older mothers are associated better children outcomes, in terms of 
schooling. However, further evidence is needed in order to estimate precisely the size and the 
duration of the intergenerational effects.  
In a model where the decision of working is considered jointly with fertility choices, we 
found women that want to be in the labor force invest more in education and less in fertility. But 
this is only a possible explanation for changes in fertility behavior, because as pointed out by the 
literature, the effect of education on fertility doesn’t shape only labor market choices (care for 
children, education, changes in aspirations, and so on).  
So from a policy perspective it’s evident that a reform on compulsory education is a good tool 
not only to promote schooling attendance itself, but also to increase women control over family 
planning choices and participation in the labor market. This is particularly relevant in a country 
where gender differences in both the labor market and educational attainment are pronounced, and 
where there is evidence that children enrollment is not yet satisfactory and their exploitation in the 
labor market still high.  
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2.8 Appendix 
 
Variable: Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Share of teachers per 100 pop 51404 2.914 1.188 .1422 10.57 
Reform 51404 .309 .462 0 1 
Average years of sch of people 
>28, by census year, by canton 51404 5.87 2.06 .9049 8.906 
Age 51404 27.27 2.25 24 31 
Census 1990 51404 .583 .494 0 1 
Share of doctors and nurse by 
1000 people 51404 3.835 2.69 0 14.19 
Wealth index 51404 .274 1.372 -2.438 9.22 
Share of married women by 
canton, by census year 51404 72.67 10.01 25 100 
bigcity 51404 .372 .483 0 1 
Table 1 Summary statistics of the variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS TOBIT TOBIT PROBIT 
Dependent variable Years of 
schooling 
Years of 
schooling 
Years of 
schooling 
Lower 
secondary 
Share of teachers per 1000 
pop 0.149*** 0.210*** 0.216*** 0.0227*** 
Reform 0.0731 0.0917 0.104* 0.0158* 
Average years of sch of 
people >28, by census year, 
by canton 
0.197*** 0.176*** 0.178*** 
0.0148*** 
Age -0.118*** -0.128*** -0.123*** 
-0.0134*** 
Census 1990 0.123 0.177 0.142 0.0654 
Share of doctors and nurse by 
1000 people -0.0632*** -0.0717*** -0.0796*** 
-0.00236 
Wealth index 1.684*** 1.906*** 1.918*** 0.225*** 
Share of married women by 
canton, by census year -0.00478* -0.00550** -0.00615** 
-0.000681 
bigcity 0.0651 0.225* 0.229* 0.0153 
Province of birth yes yes yes yes 
Sigma  3.720*** 3.733***  
Observations 51404 51404 49928 49928 
R-squared 0.422 . .  
Pseudo R-sq  0.0964 0.0959  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Table 2a Schooling equation: OLS, Tobit and probit models. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Model MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL: Marginal effects 
Dependent variable no 
schooling some prim primary lower sec secondary 
some tert 
or above 
Share of teachers 
per 1000 pop 0.00393* -0.0112*** -0.0122*** -0.000830 0.00793*** 0.0124*** 
Reform -0.00384 -0.00298 -0.0153* 0.0127*** 0.00948 -0.00011 
Average years of 
sch of people >28, 
by census year, by 
canton 
-0.0179*** -0.00507 0.00758 0.0143*** -0.00541* 0.00653** 
Age 0.0053*** 0.0114*** -0.00322* -0.00557*** -0.00440*** -0.004*** 
Census 1990 0.00957 -0.0793*** -0.000798 0.0115 0.0002** 0.0007* 
Share of doctors 
and nurse by 1000 
people 
0.00364*** -0.00275 9.70e-05 0.00155 -0.00271 0.000173 
Wealth index -0.0554*** -0.110*** -0.0625*** 0.0495*** 0.0762*** 0.103*** 
Share of married 
women by canton, 
by census year 
0.000104 0.000621*** -2.32e-05 0.000253 -0.000144 -0.001*** 
bigcity 0.0209** -0.0173* -0.0167 -0.0127* 0.0252* 0.000625 
Province of birth yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sigma       
Observations 49928 49928 49928 49928 49928 49928 
R-squared       
Pseudo R-sq 0.1627 0.1627 0.1627 0.1627 0.1627 0.1627 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Table 2b Schooling equation: marginal effects of the multinomial logit model. 
 
 
 
 
Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption 
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives 
Omitted lnL(full) lnL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2 evidence 
some_primary -2.57e+04 -2.57e+04 106.082 96 0.226 for Ho 
Primary -2.17e+04 -2.17e+04 110.459 96 0.149 for Ho 
lower_secondary -2.70e+04 -2.70e+04 97.439 96 0.440 for Ho 
Secondary -2.82e+04 -2.82e+04 91.591 96 0.608 for Ho 
some_tert or above -2.71e+04 -2.71e+04 92.983 96 0.568 for Ho 
Table 3 Small-Hsiao test for IIA assumption 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
MODEL: PROBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
TEST: 
Prob of being 
mother before the 
end of lower sec 
Trend on the 
OLD group 
Reform on 
the YOUNG 
group 
Years of schooling -0.00177***   
Share of teachers per 100 pop -0.000674 0.163*** 0.261*** 
Reform -0.00119  0.286* 
Average years of sch of people >28, by census year, by canton 0.000835 0.248*** 0.111* 
Age -0.000359 -0.140*** -0.0368 
Census 1990 0.00472** 0.100  
Share of doctors and nurse by 1000 people 0.000333 -0.0850*** -0.0729*** 
Wealth index -0.00138*** 1.938*** 1.900*** 
Share of married women by canton, by census year 0.000133** -0.000899 -0.0124*** 
bigcity -0.00503** 0.233 0.215 
Sigma  3.693*** 3.763*** 
Observations 49928 23135 26793 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Table 4 Different checks on schooling and fertility. The first model is meant to exclude the possibility that 
the reform affects direcly fertilty before age 15, while the other two colums present the shooling equation for the 
sample of young (aged 24-27) women and the sample of old (aged 28-31) separately. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
MODEL: 
probit 
(MFX) 
iv probit 
(MFX): 
second stage 
iv probit 
(MFX): first 
stage 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
BEING A 
MOTHER 
BEFORE 18 
BEING A 
MOTHER 
BEFORE 18 
PROB OF 
COMPLETING 
LOWER SEC 
Share of teachers per 100 pop   0.0292*** 
Reform   0.0931*** 
Average years of sch of people >28, by 
census year, by canton 
  
0.00655 
Completion of lower secondary school -0.104*** -0.0707***  
Age -0.00288* -0.00280* -0.00605 
Share of doctors and nurse by 1000 
people -0.00302*** -0.00262*** -0.000642 
Wealth index -0.0151*** -0.0215*** 0.225*** 
Share of married women by canton, by 
census year 0.000975*** 0.00103*** -0.00108** 
bigcity 0.00563 0.00342 0.0130 
Province of birth yes yes yes 
rho_12  -0.12***  
Observations 26793 26793 26793 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Table 5 Marginal effects for the fertility equations: standard probit model and IV estimation. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EQUATIONS: 
LAB 
MKT 
PART 
TEENAGE 
MOTHER 
LOWER 
SEC 
mfx_LAB 
EQUAT. 
mfx_FERT 
EQ 
REGRESSORS:      
Lower Secondary 0.949*** -0.290**  0.350*** -0.0529** 
Teen fertility -1.070***   -0.312***  
Share of teachers per 1000 pop   0.0779***   
Reform   0.241***   
Average years of sch of people older than 28, by 
census year, by canton   0.0144   
Share of doctors and nurse by 1000 people  -0.0113* -0.000895  -0.00212* 
Share of married women by canton, by census 
year 
 0.00755*** -0.00404***  0.00141*** 
Age -0.0184** -0.0213** -0.0114 -0.00688** -0.00398** 
Wealth index 0.0967*** -0.129*** 0.587*** 0.0361*** -0.0240*** 
bigcity 0.185*** 0.0127 0.0298 0.0696*** 0.00238 
Province of birth yes yes yes yes yes 
tau_12 0.527** 0.527**    
tau_13 -0.273***  -0.273***   
tau_23  -0.183** -0.183**   
Observations 26793 26793 26793 26793 26793 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Table 6: Trivariate probit model for education, fertility and labor market participation 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 education on age education on age education on age education on age 
 SAMPLE firstborns firstborns all children all children 
moth age at birth 13 -0.0348 -0.0424 -0.0164 -0.0143 
moth age at birth 14 -0.0683* -0.0669** -0.0304 -0.0183 
moth age at birth 15 0.00719 0.00731 0.0351 0.0469** 
moth age at birth 16 0.0236 0.0303 0.0467* 0.0628*** 
moth age at birth 17 0.0604* 0.0555** 0.0624** 0.0723*** 
moth age at birth 18 0.0647** 0.0621** 0.0708*** 0.0783*** 
moth age at birth 19 0.0811** 0.0727*** 0.0819*** 0.0891*** 
moth age at birth 20 0.0964*** 0.0846*** 0.0764*** 0.0848*** 
moth age at birth 21 0.0820** 0.0744*** 0.0740*** 0.0850*** 
moth age at birth 22 0.0993*** 0.0913*** 0.0705*** 0.0781*** 
moth age at birth 23 0.0593* 0.0508* 0.0701*** 0.0784*** 
moth age at birth 24 0.107*** 0.0922*** 0.0725*** 0.0802*** 
moth age at birth 25 0.0936** 0.0822*** 0.0812*** 0.0871*** 
moth age at birth 26 -0.00226 0.0457 0.0711*** 0.0788*** 
moth age at birth 27   0.0686*** 0.0777*** 
moth age at birth 28   0.0624** 0.0718*** 
moth age at birth 29   0.0582** 0.0688*** 
moth age at birth 30   0.0629** 0.0706*** 
moth age at birth 31   0.0726*** 0.0773*** 
moth age at birth 32   0.0622** 0.0691*** 
moth age at birth 33   0.0491* 0.0615*** 
moth age at birth 34   0.0528** 0.0561*** 
moth age at birth 35   0.0460* 0.0517** 
moth age at birth 36   0.0606** 0.0726*** 
moth age at birth 37   0.0649*** 0.0711*** 
moth age at birth 38   0.0586** 0.0673*** 
moth age at birth 39   0.0409 0.0514** 
moth age at birth 40   0.0488* 0.0657*** 
labforce 0.00153 -0.0163** -0.0422 -0.0131*** 
mothage_j*lab force  yes no yes no 
 
not significant  not significant  
sex 0.0115** 0.0115** 0.0164*** 0.0164*** 
Num sib -0.0130*** -0.0130*** -0.0117*** -0.0118*** 
Baby sib -0.0232*** -0.0232*** -0.0137*** -0.0137*** 
Fam size 0.00892 0.00912 0.00928*** 0.00937*** 
sqfamsize -0.000458 -0.000468 -0.000487*** -0.000489*** 
Father in hh 0.00872 0.00824 0.000490 0.000386 
Edu head HH 0.00888*** 0.00882*** 0.0110*** 0.0110*** 
Share of teachers 0.00575** 0.00588** 0.00885*** 0.00887*** 
Wealth index 0.0318*** 0.0316*** 0.0422*** 0.0422*** 
urban 0.0127 0.0127 0.0152** 0.0152** 
Province of birth yes yes yse yes 
Observations 12830 12830 97916 97916 
R-squared 0.145 0.144 0.173 0.173 
Pseudo R-squared     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Table 7 Intergenerational effects: columns (1) –(4) mother age at birth on children education. 
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3 The demand for skilled workers after the “3+2” university reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
Based on a survey on employers’ preferences over prospective workers hiring practices, this 
work focuses on the variations in the demand for skilled labor force after a reform of the Italian 
University system. This reform caused an increase in tertiary education attendance and a reduction 
in drop out rates. Whether graduates are more likely to be hired after the increase in the supply of 
skilled human capital or not is investigated, paying attention to the kind of occupation for which 
they are required. Since the reform modified both the length of degrees and course contents, this 
work also attempts to study employers’ choice between the BA and the MA graduates.  
Results show that the demand for skilled workers increased and this is mainly driven by the 
fact that employers are substituting less skilled workers with more skilled ones for clerical and 
technical occupations.  
Factors that could have altered post-reform hiring decisions are presented and discussed and 
evidence suggests that they should not lead to overestimate the effect of the University reform.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
In 2001 the Italian university system underwent a radical reform that modified the length of 
studies as part of the Bologna process, which is aimed at creating a common and integrate European 
educational system.37 Before 2001 students attended a unitary system that lasted four to five years, 
while with the reform a two-tier system is introduced.38 A two-years ‘master’ degree now follows a 
three-years ‘basic’ one, and students can decide whether to take only the BA degree or to continue 
for five years. For those that decide to take only the BA (three years), the reform basically implied a 
reduction in the length of studies; so on one side we should be observing higher enrolment (because 
of lowered opportunity cost), lower drop out rates and shorter graduation times; on the other it’s not 
clear how the new ‘regime’ met labor market needs in terms of skills and competencies. 
Up to now most of the scholars analyzed the reform effects looking at the supply side of the 
labor market. Findings confirm the efficacy of the reform in terms of increasing access, lowering 
drop out and decreasing age at degree (see among others the work by Cappellari and Lucifora, 
2009).  
This paper instead is focused on the hiring choices of employers before and after the reform 
and investigates how workers’ required characteristics changed. This is one of the first attempts of 
assessing the effects of the Italian University system and it is based directly on employers hiring 
                                                 
37
 The reform also introduced the credit system and gave each university the right to choose the curricula for the courses 
offered. Credits are given to students according to the specific workload associated to each subject in the curricula. 
3 Note that in Italy ‘actual’ time to degree differed a lot from the legal length of university courses. On average students 
graduate at 27 (see for example Moscati, 2000), so that even if the pre and post reform system should be diverging only 
by one year, the shortening in graduation times caused by reform could be even larger. 
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plans. From a policy perspective it’s relevant to explore labor market outcomes of such a drastic 
institutional change.  
The analysis makes use of six waves of Excelsior survey, collected by Unioncamere 
(Association of Italian Chambers of Commerce), which reports for each firm a) the required 
characteristics that future employees should have, in terms of skills, experience and age, b) the 
profession for which each worker is required and her type of employment contract and c) the 
general characteristics of the firm, such as dimension, industry, geographical area and whether it 
exports. So we will first explore whether the reform increased the probability that a graduate is 
hired, focusing on the jobs for which graduates are more required. Then only looking at the post 
reform period, the circumstances under which a BA graduate is preferred over a MA graduate are 
taken into account. In this way the kind of job and firms’ characteristics that are best fitted by the 
new types of degrees are explored.  
 
In the following section we will explore in more details the university reform that was 
implemented. Then we review the existing literature about this reform effects and in general about 
the Bologna Process in other countries. Next we present the data and the different models that 
explore reform’s effects on employers’ choice. A discussion on potential confounding factors 
follows and the last section concludes. 
 
 
3.3 Institutional features of the university reform  
 
In this section we will briefly describe the changes in the university system to which Italy had 
been exposed. 
Before the reform, Italy was characterized by a unitary system of tertiary education. Students 
after secondary school could either enroll in university courses that should last from four to six 
years, or in another kind of short ones called ‘diploma’, that lasted only for three years. This last 
option was scarcely diffused, and most of the students attended a standard four years university 
course.39 Note also that in Italy getting the degree is of primary importance, because it has a legal 
value (which means that a degree is often a prerequisite to enter public sector and all regulated 
jobs).40 Under the previous regime, the Italian university system was characterized by several 
problems: low enrollment, high drop out rates and selectivity in the access by parental background, 
long lasting graduation times and rigidity of the curricula.  
The 2001 reform meant both to tackle the aforementioned problems and to uniform Italian 
tertiary education system to the European one and preceded along two lines: it changed the 
curricula (simplifying course contents and creating new degrees of study) and it introduced a two 
levels system that replaced the unitary old ‘regime’. Now a BA degree lasting three years forms the 
first step of tertiary education. It should provide students with general knowledge of scientific 
principles, but also with more practical skills (a training period is compulsory in many courses). 
After that, students can decide either to join the labor market or to attend two more years of 
university, thus getting a MA equivalent degree, during which they get advanced education and 
specialize. So basically legislators made easier the access to university and its completion, 
modifying both the contents and the legal duration of the BA level. Those that stop after three years 
get a lower qualification than those that completed the ‘old’ one tier system, but this should be 
compensated by the fact that they are younger and already with some labor market experience, as 
training became compulsory in most of the courses. 
                                                 
39
 This type of ‘diploma’ degree was implemented only in 1996 and so few students have had the chance to enroll by 
the time the reform of the university system was passed and the diploma was substituted by the BA level degree. 
Probably a few more years would have been needed in order for the ‘diploma’ to become a frequently required option. 
40
 Many occupations in Italy are regulated: prospective architects, doctors, lawyers among others after the degree should 
pass a State exam in order to be fully entitled to practice. 
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Data collected by CNVSU (National Committee for Evaluating the University System) in 
Table 1 show that the total number of graduates increased in the post reform period. Before the 
reform the share of those that falls in the category BA degree/‘diploma’ is small, especially in the 
southern areas.  
 
Total number of graduates, by type of degree Total number of graduates, by type of degree 
2000-2002 2006-2008 
  old regime BA - diploma MA tot  old regime 
BA - 
diploma MA tot 
north west 113708 19426 0 133134 north west 38012 127316 47627 212955 
north east 98051 16672 0 114723 north east 39472 100075 30988 170535 
centre 117186 20518 0 137704 centre 61437 137191 36396 235024 
south 134277 14480 0 148757 south 98978 146609 29415 275002 
Share of graduates, by type of degree Share of graduates, by type of degree 
north west 0.854 0.146 0 1 north west 0.178 0.598 0.224 1 
north east 0.855 0.145 0 1 north east 0.231 0.587 0.182 1 
centre 0.851 0.149 0 1 centre 0.261 0.584 0.155 1 
south 0.903 0.097 0 1 south 0.360 0.533 0.107 1 
Table 1 Graduates by type of degree before and after the reform. Old regime refers to the unitary tier old 
system graduates and to graduates from the courses whose length was not modified; BA degree or the old 
diploma refers either to the new ‘short’ degree or the ‘old’ diploma; MA degree includes those with the 5 years 
degree under the new regime. Source: CNVSU, Annual report on graduates, various years. 
 
The group that refers to those with the BA degree and to the diploma includes, also in the pre 
reform period, those that were enrolled in the old ‘regime’ but decided to pass on to the new one, so 
that even in 2002 there are students that got the new 3 years BA degree. In most of the cases, those 
are students that were a way older than they should be in order to graduate on time and that decided 
for the ‘short’ degree in order to graduate faster. Remember that in Italy under the old regime 
people took on average 3 more years to graduate with respect to the legal duration of university. 
The group with a BA degree becomes consistent in the post reform era, even if there are still (late) 
graduates from the old unitary system and from those courses whose length was not modified by the 
reform. In fact, the reform didn’t change the duration and the structure of some courses and so we 
put graduates from those courses in the ‘old regime’ category.41 Those that took the MA degree are 
less than 20% in all areas except in the northwest. So according to this picture, on one side this 
reform played a role in increasing the supply of skilled human capital, but on the other almost 60% 
of the new graduates attended a shorter course than before, while less than 20% complete the new 
MA degree. It’s crucial to mention though that we don’t know if some of those with a ‘short’ degree 
will specialize in the future, so what we see here is just the number of graduates at the time when 
the employers, in the surveys focus of our analysis, have to make their choices.  
 
  2000-2002 2006-2008 
Graduates on time 67705 285116 
Total number of graduates 534309 893516 
Share of graduates on time on total number of grads 0,13 0,32 
Table 2 Share of graduates that got their degree on time, according to the legal duration of their university 
course. Source: CNVSU, Annual report on graduates, various years. 
 
                                                 
41
 The degrees whose length was not modified are: medicine, dentistry, construction engineering , pharmacology and 
law. 
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It’s also worth noting that the share of those that graduated respecting the legal duration of 
their course (with respect to total number of graduates) shows a sharp increase in the post reform 
period: from 13% in the pre reform era to 32% (see Table 2 above); so after the reform not only the 
total number of graduates increased, but also graduation times clearly shortened. As a result the 
skilled supply of labor is larger and younger than before the reform.  
According to the evidence just presented that documents a relevant shift in the skill 
composition of the labor force it is important to analyze what are labor market outcomes of the 
reform.  
 
 
3.4 The literature  
 
The existing literature about the 2001 Italian university reform is still limited, especially if 
one is interested to labor market outcomes of graduates from the new ‘regime’.  
Studies on tertiary education in other countries find that family income affects directly the 
decision to enroll in a tertiary education program. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) focus on the 
effects of credit constraint on higher education enrolment in the US, showing that financial 
limitations are a relevant matter. Vandenberghe (2007) explores the relationship between income 
and tertiary education participation in some European countries with an IV estimation and finds that 
there is a causal positive effect of income on higher education enrollment, with the exception of 
Belgium and Germany. In a paper about Britain, Blanden et al. (2004) find that family income has a 
causal impact on the decision to enroll in college. So those works agree on the possibility that 
whenever costs, both direct or indirect, are removed or lowered, there is an increase in access to 
higher educational systems.  
The Italian tertiary education is analyzed by Cappellari and Lucifora (2009); they argue that 
the reform had a relevant impact on the likelihood to enroll of those students that come from 
unfavorable parental background, so that it can be considered as a process that removed at least 
some inequality in higher education attendance. It also reduced drop-out, even if with respect to this 
facet the effect is more limited. Di Pietro and Cutillo (2008) also point that the reform triggered a 
change in student behavior that caused a decrease in the drop-out ratio. The fall in drop-out is not 
caused by a change in students’ characteristics, but by a change in their attitude and motivation. 
This is consistent with the finding that the reform favored those coming from poor parental 
background whose drop-out ‘attitude’ would have been probably higher. So the effect of the reform 
had been twofold: it increased access and motivation.   
Bratti et al. (2010) in a paper about the Economics faculty at Marche Polytechnic University 
find out that the reform, reducing students’ workload, increases the likelihood of passing exams. 
The paper suggests two possible explanations: either professors changed their ‘grading standards’, 
or university became more effective. Even if it can’t be proved which one of these two hypothesis 
holds, there is evidence indicating that the reform caused grade inflation, so that it became less 
costly to get a degree.42 Boero et al. (2005), using a data set based upon administrative archives of 
the universities of Cagliari and Viterbo, analyze post-reform students’ outcomes, in terms of 
progression and retentions. They find that gender, parental background and prior educational 
performance still play a significant role for progression and drop out. Despite the reform, 
withdrawal and age at degree remain high, even if they are lowered under the new regime; so they 
argue that other major reform are needed in order to improve Italian university system. By the way, 
the reader should keep in mind that those works are case studies, as they refer to specific 
universities that are not representative of the national university system.  
So, in Italy, on one side the reform had an impact in promoting the access to higher education 
among the least advantaged, potentially favoring social mobility in a country where instead 
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 By the way, we should keep in mind that this work is a case study and takes into account only the first year of a 
specific faculty, so we don’t know if their argument can be generalized to the whole university system.  
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intergenerational mobility in terms of educational level is low, as pointed out by Checchi et al. 
(1999); on the other, this result has been achieved probably lowering quality so that exams are 
failed less frequently because professors decreased the required standards. This explains the 
observed decrease in the age at degree and in drop out. So consistently with other works on tertiary 
education, when costs of education are lowered, access increases.  
It’s not clear then what could be the effects of such a reform once students join the labor 
market, because the share of graduates in the labor force increased, but at the same time it seems 
that there is a decrease in the skill content of the new regime’s degree.  
Since other countries in Europe went through the same reform, there are attempts of assessing 
its effects; since the implementation is very recent the analysis is still limited. For Germany 
Horstschräer and Sprietsma (2010) instead find no significant effect of the Bologna process in terms 
of both enrollment and drop out ratio. Portela et al. (2009) analyze the effect of the Bologna Process 
in Portugal, where the implementation of the reform varied over institutions and curricula. They 
show that the demand for academic programs whose duration was reduced by the reform is in fact 
increased. Along with this result, their evidence suggests also that the reformed curricula are 
‘second best’ choices and not first best.  
The demand side had been never studied up to now with few exceptions, because the first new 
‘regime’ graduates wave entered the labor market just in 2004. According a CNVSU report (2009) 
on Italian university system, the share of new ‘regime’ graduates became higher that that of the old 
‘regime’ only from 2006, meaning that there were transition years during which the supply of 
young skilled human capital was composed by the two types of graduates.43   
Bosio and Leonardi (2010) look at the effect of the university reform on the labor market, 
using administrative data on the new ‘regime’ graduates and on the number of new courses opened 
by university, in order to proxy for the variation in the supply of skilled human capital. Their 
estimation takes also into account the timing of labor market reforms that are a proxy for variation 
in the demand for graduates. They find that the there was an increase in the number of graduates 
hired, but a decrease in college wage premium and in the quality of the contracts (fixed term are use 
more extensively among graduates than before).  
Villosio (2010) interviewed 226 firms’ personnel managers about their opinions over the 
graduates from the new regime. She mainly focused about how workers with short and long degrees 
met market needs, in terms of skills acquired. Her results point out that the reform didn’t succeed in 
creating flexible workers and that both BA and MA graduates are hired. With the exception of some 
sector in which MA graduates are preferred over the less specialized ones, the difference between 
the two types is not so sharp. She concludes saying that a BA graduate with two years experience is 
equivalent to a graduate with a MA degree.  
In the next section we present the dataset that is used for assessing how the demand for 
graduates varied after the university reform.  
 
 
3.5 Data description 
 
In this analysis we use six waves of the Excelsior survey in order to determine the demand for 
skilled workers. Data taken from Excelsior have also been used by economists in other studies 
(Cappellari et al. 2010, Campa et al. 2009, Colombo and Stanca, 2008), but never for this purpose.  
Every year the Association of Italian Chambers of Commerce by mean of that survey asks 
firms about the characteristics of future employees. The Excelsior survey is included in the official 
statistics produced on an annual basis within the Italian National Statistical System (SISTAN).  
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 CNVSU is the national center for university system evaluation and provides yearly detailed statistics and analysis on 
the characteristics of the Italian high educational system and depends directly from the Italian Ministry of Education 
and Research.   
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This survey is supported and promoted by the Labor Ministry and it’s mandatory. The firms 
involved are all those with more then one employee and that are registered at the local Chambers of 
Commerce. Public enterprises, such as schools, universities and hospitals, are excluded, while 
professional offices, like those of lawyers and architects, are included. When information is missing 
or incomplete, it is integrated from sources other than the survey (National Institute of Social 
Security - INPS, Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority – INAIL, etc…). After the information 
about all the firms is collected, a representative sample is drawn to form the Excelsior survey we 
use here.44 So by mean of this survey we can estimate the expected labor demand for the current 
year (interviews are made each January and ask about intentions for the same year). 
The pre reform period refers to 2001, 2002 and 2003, while the post reform to 2007, 2008 and 
2009 and the same firms that answered the survey at least in one year in the pre reform period were 
interviewed again after the reform (please keep in mind that not all firms answered the survey in 
each year in each sub-period, if no new workers are wanted, see the Table 3). If they don’t plan to 
hire anyone in any of the years after the reform, then they are recorded only in the pre reform era 
and, vice versa, they might be listed in the post reform period but not in the pre reform for the same 
reason. An analogous reasoning holds for firms that exit the market or for new entrants. So for 
19620 private firms we can determine the demand for graduates before and after the reform (and if 
we include also those firms that are recorded in one period only, the number raises to 29378 and 
30910 in the pre and post reform period respectively, see Tables 4 and 5 for further details).  
 
  2001-2003 2007-2009 
Number of firms that are in: Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 survey out of 3 9165 31.2 31.2 6151 19.9 19.9 
2 surveys out of 3 9129 31.07 62.27 8531 27.6 47.5 
3 surveys out of 3 11084 37.73 100 16228 52.5 100 
Total 29378 100   30910 100   
Table 3 Firms divided according to the number of surveys they are in, by each sub-period. 
We don’t have information on hiring practices for each single year, but we consider each sub-
period as one, so we don’t know if the information referred to the pre reform period is referred to 
2001, 2002 or 2003. Anyway we know in what years each firm answered the questionnaire. The 
years between 2003 and 2006 have been excluded, because in that period the share of graduates 
from the old ‘regime’ was still greater than that from the new one and it would not be possible to 
assert anything about the effect of the reform.   
Each questionnaire reports information on prospective workers and on the firm itself, and for 
every type of worker the required characteristics are listed, so that every cell in the data set 
corresponds to a worker.   
The set of variables collected on the prospective workers are: the required educational level 
(lower secondary education, vocational training, secondary schooling, university) and the specific 
field, experience, training, sex and age (if lower than 25 or not). The questionnaire also specifies if 
a foreign language and IT knowledge are needed. For every worker the employer has to detail the 
type of contract, if permanent or temporary, and the type of occupation to which she is assigned.45  
The person that fills in the survey is also asked to give some details about the firm: number of 
employees and the expected turnover, specific industry, geographical area (North-east, north-west, 
center and south) and whether the firm exports (we only know if it does or not).46  
 
                                                 
44
 Further details about how the representative sample is build can be found at: 
http://excelsior.unioncamere.net/web/notametodologica3.php and in the following web pages about methodology. 
45
 Occupation is classified following Istat-ISCO categories and in the analysis we will mainly refer to the 1-digit and 2-
digits classifications.  
46
 Industries are classified following ATECO 2002 categories, provided by the National Statistical Office.  
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Time 
Nr of 
required 
workers 
Av nr 
workers,by 
firm 
Nr of 
firms 
requiring 
workers 
Nr of 
required 
grads 
Av nr 
grads,by 
firm 
Nr of 
firms 
requiring 
grads 
All firms (‘unbalanced’)       
2001-2002 623358 21.2 29378 72270 15.5 4657 
2007-2009 675258 21.8 30910 101163 13.7 7358 
Total 1298616  60288 173433  12015 
Firms  in both time 
periods (‘balanced’)       
2001-2002 585741 29.9 19620 69460 16.9 4105 
2007-2009 619489 31.6 19620 96751 15.9 6074 
Total 1205230  39240 166211  10179 
Table 4 Number of firms in each period and number of required workers, total and graduates. 
 
Some descriptive statistics are in Table 4 and report the number of new workers required by 
the firms in the sample, while the full set of variables is described in Table 8 in the Appendix. So in 
the first sub-period firms were looking for 623358 new workers (12% were graduates, at least with 
the diploma), while in the post reform period workers were 675258 (15% of graduates). While the 
average required number of workers by each firm increased over time, the average number of 
graduates required by firms is lower in the post reform era, meaning that there are more firms hiring 
graduates. This is telling that there were firms that before the reform didn’t hire graduates and that 
start doing it after the reform.  
From Table 8 in the Appendix, we notice that people younger than 25 are less required after 
the reform and this could be explained by the fact that workers have to be more educated, but also 
with more working experience (the share of required workers without experience drop from 46% to 
32%) and training (the share of workers with training increases from 69% to 85%).   
Unfortunately we don’t have information about firms that don’t hire in those years or that 
only fire. We don’t have information about firms’ innovativeness for the pre reform period, so we 
can’t control if the demand for graduates is driven by firms that innovate or correspond to a general 
expansion in the educational level of each firms’ human capital.47  
 
In order to determine the reform’s effects, the ‘ideal’ data set should allow us to keep track of 
the individuals’ placement both during university and afterwards. Alternatively we should have 
very detailed information about whom firms hire with respect to age, place of birth, current and past 
address (in the school years), name of the university that provided education and type of contract 
and wages. The ideal data set should take into account the spatial variation of the reforms and 
should cover a time span long enough to control for a general underlying trend.  
In this way we could find out the precise extent to which the university reform impacts the 
demand for highly educated human capital, controlling also for the territorial variation in the 
implementation of the university and employment deregulation reforms. Unfortunately no such a 
data source exists, but we’ll analyze the available data in order to retrieve from them all the possible 
information.  
 
 
3.6 Models and results 
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 Firms are asked whether they produce goods/services new to the market only in the post reform period, so they are 
not comparable over time with respect to this issue.   
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3.6.1 The before and after comparison in a probit model 
In this section we will present the results meant to find out if there are significant differences 
between the two periods that could be attributed to the ‘3+2’ reform.  
First of all we will consider how the demand for skilled workers varies, taking the two periods 
separately (columns 1,2 of Table 9 in the Appendix). The outcome is a binary variable that is equal 
to 1 if the prospective worker is a graduate and 0 otherwise. In order to distinguish if the graduate 
got a BA degree (that is compared with the diploma in the first period) or a MA degree (5 years 
under the new system, standard degree in the old unitary system) we weight the each request by ¾ 
and 5/4 respectively. This weight reflects the fact that a graduate that is specialized under the new 
‘regime’ had to study for 5 years, while for the short degree only 3 years are needed. The 
denominator represents the number of years (officially) needed to complete university under the old 
unitary system. We weighted even the old system diploma by ¾ as it lasts 3 years. This is a 
simplification since the diploma is not really equivalent to the new BA three years degree, but is the 
best we could do in order to make a distinction from the university degree.  
The two first models agree on the sharp increase of the proportion of graduates in the 
technical and clerical occupations. The use of a permanent contract is positively correlated with the 
demand for skilled human capital in the post reform era. From this viewpoint, it seems that 
employers, when demanding highly educated workers, don’t make use of temporary contracts in the 
post reform period more extensively than before, not at least in relative terms. We don’t find any 
significant result in terms of the required experience, but training in the pre reform period is 
significantly related to the demand for graduates. A gender preference is more marked in the first 
period, and it is reasonable to assume that for those occupations for which a graduate is needed, 
gender should be indifferent.48 In this preliminary analysis it’s also worth noting that while in the 
pre-reform period the demand for graduates came from big firms, in the new era the impact of 
firms’ dimension is less strong. After the reform knowing a foreign language is less a distinctive 
characteristic of graduates, probably because it is becoming a requisite even for less qualified 
human capital.  
The before and after comparison showed in column (3) of the same Table, reveals that there is 
in fact an increase in the demand for graduates; the time effect is highly significant: in the post 
reform period the demand for skilled workers increased by 0,68%. This model not only takes into 
account firms’ dimension, but also the prospective turnover of all personnel. In this way we can 
control for the fact that the firms that require more graduates could also be those that require more 
personnel in general (or vice versa). Since the marginal effect for the turnover is not different from 
zero we can exclude that the demand for highly skilled human capital is driven by ever-expanding 
firms. Firms’ dimension is anyway positively related to our outcome: bigger firms hire more 
graduates than smaller firms. Employers also require that the highly educated human capital be 
trained, even if in this context it’s not clear enough what is meant for training.  
It’s important to notice that the old graduates are preferred over young ones. This in part can 
reflect that the new BA degree is not enough for employers, but also we should keep in mind that 
we are estimating the relative demand for graduates, so we are always comparing graduates with 
non-graduates. In this perspective it’s quite obvious that low skilled human capital can be relatively 
younger then highly skilled. And also note that the reference category here is that age is not an 
important characteristic to look at when choosing a worker, so it’s not clear at all how choices are 
shaped over age. Surprisingly, experience does not play a role here, but again this should be due in 
part to the fact that the we’re comparing graduates vs. non graduates, for which probably experience 
is more relevant (at least in relative terms). An aspect that should be important for evaluating the 
university reform is that employers report that they won’t have problems in finding prospective 
graduates because of a lack of educational facilities; however, for some jobs people are not 
qualified enough. Our interpretation is that universities courses supply responds to market needs, 
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 For example job for highly educated people should not require strength, so men should not be preferred over women.  
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but people choose not to enroll in some courses. So, there is a mismatch between the demand and 
the supply of labor due not to a lack of the educational system, but to people decisions.  
However, the choices of each worker’s education and of worker’s other characteristics 
(occupation, type of contract, age, sex, experience, IT and foreign language knowledge, training) 
could be determined jointly, so that the variation in the demand for graduates could also include 
changes in all required workers’ characteristics. In this model we control for workers’ 
characteristics in order to test how the demand for high skilled human capital varied, ceteribus 
paribus. So keeping fix occupations, age, gender preferences and all the other characteristics, we 
investigate whether the required number of graduates changed or not in the post reform period.  
Performing the same regression of column (3), but excluding the characteristics the could be 
determined potentially jointly with the educational level, we obtain that the demand for graduates 
increased by 3.5%, as shown in column (4) of Table 9 in the Appendix. This results show that the 
choice of the worker’s educational level is done simultaneously to the choice of other workers’ 
characteristics that are observed in this survey. This result is not conflicting with the previous one, 
but simply we have a model that allows that jointly with educational level other employees’ 
characteristics vary.  
The same probit model is then considered only on the sample of firms that are in both sub-
periods; results are stronger in term of the impact that regressors have on the estimated probability 
(column 2 of Table 10 in the Appendix), so that in the post reform era the probability of hiring a 
graduate is increased by 0,73% (against 0.68%, so +11%). Marginal effects are in absolute value 
bigger than those of the ‘unbalanced’ case, meaning that those firms that are in both time periods 
are selected, even if this difference does not contradict our main result. If we think that in this 
regression we are excluding a) firms that join the survey only in the post reform era because new 
entrants, b) firms that are only in the pre reform period because they exit the market, c) firms that 
don’t hire new personnel for long time periods, this result is plausible.  
In order to investigate how firms are selected we analyze the characteristics of firms that are 
in both sub-periods and of those that appear just in one of them. We find that the always-respondent 
firms are on average bigger and located in the northwest, and conversely those that are just in the 
before reform era or in the post reform era are smaller and more frequently placed in the south of 
Italy. Differences at industry level are less clearly shaped. So, performing just a regression on the 
group of firms that are in both periods might be misleading and not representative. Anyway, our 
main result does not differ dramatically in the ‘unbalanced’ and in the ‘balanced’ case.  
Again we consider the model excluding the characteristics that could be determined jointly 
with the prospective worker’s educational level, focusing on the ‘balanced’ group of firms (column 
(3) of Table 10 in the Appendix). Consistently with what we have already found the likelihood of 
hiring a graduates is increased by 3.7%, because we are not taking into account characteristics that 
might have varied together with the required educational level and firms that are just in one sup-
period. Anyway, this last set of results is in line with the ‘unbalanced’ case with the exclusion of 
workers characteristics.    
 
 
3.6.2 The increase of graduates: overall trend or growth in some occupations? 
As we already commented before, for some jobs (technicians and clerks) the share of 
graduates increased substantially and here we will provide evidence aimed at showing whether the 
change in the demand for graduates is driven by the expansion of the two occupations or it is 
triggered by a substitution between skilled and unskilled workers for the aforementioned jobs.  
By mean of a shift-share analysis, we decompose the variation in the proportion of graduates 
along two dimensions: time and type of job.  
Given the share of graduates in each occupation in the two periods and given the weight of 
each occupation in the whole economy, we can observe two things. First we analyze what would 
have happened to the share of graduates in each job, if their share was fixed at the level of the pre 
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reform period and only the overall weight of each occupation did vary. To be clearer: if the share of 
graduates had followed proportionally the expansion of each occupation how it would have 
increased/decreased? This tells how important is the effect of the expansion of some jobs in 
triggering the increase/decrease in the demand for graduates. Results are reported in column (10) of 
Table 12 in the Appendix and show that for the managerial occupations the share of graduates 
should have decreased by 0,2% (or by 1215 units) if it would have varied proportionally with the 
weight of that occupation in the economy. For the scientific and highly specialized occupation there 
was a decrease in their weight in the economy, so that if graduates would have followed this decline 
they should have decreased by 0.3%. Conversely graduates should have increased by 0,2% (or by 
1608 units) if they had varied proportionally with the weight of the clerical jobs. This means that 
the share of clerks in the economy grew and this is a factor driving the increase in the demand for 
highly skilled human capital. For the other kind of jobs the change in the proportion of graduates 
followed the trend of each occupation. 
 Column (11) of the same Table, shows how the proportion of graduates would have varied if 
the weight of each occupation had stayed the same. This shows the change in the share of graduates 
that we would have observed even without the expansion of some specific occupations, pointing out 
the increase in the skill intensity of each job. So even if the highly specialized occupation didn’t 
increase their weight in the economy, graduates increased by 0,1% in those jobs. The biggest 
increase is observed for technical occupations: keeping fixed the weight of these jobs, the share of 
graduates increased by 2,8%, so after the reform the required human capital is more skilled. If the 
weight of clerical occupations was constant, the share of graduates would have increased by 0,9%, 
meaning that even for that jobs the intensity of highly skilled human capital grew over time.  
This evidence is suggesting that those occupations for which the skilled human capital 
intensity is higher showed a decline in the years taken into account. Highly specialized occupations 
category includes: mathematicians, physicists, architects and urban planners, doctors and nurses, 
managers, financial analysts and officers, social scientists, lawyers and judges, professors, 
researchers, teachers, educators and artists. Instead those occupations that traditionally showed a 
lower intensity of highly skilled human capital gained momentum. The substitution of less skilled 
workers with more skilled ones is the factor that mainly drives the increase in the demand for 
graduates for the technical and clerical jobs.  
 
3.7 Discussion 
It’s clear that any before and after comparison should be taken with caution, especially in 
those cases where other events took place in the meanwhile the university reform was implemented. 
Here we will present and discuss the possible confounding factors that might have altered 
employers’ hiring decisions and we will provide evidence that support the thesis that the increase in 
the demand for skilled human capital is driven by the university reform.  
 
3.7.1 Reforms in employment protection regulation  
Our main concern is if the reforms in the labor market regulation altered the demand for 
workers, as they could have reduced labor costs.49 Even if regions and sectors implement the reform 
at different times, given the structure of our data set, that information can’t be used fruitfully, as we 
can’t locate firms at regional level. According the preliminary analysis done by Cappellari et al. 
(2010), the 2003 reform increased the turnover of workers, meaning that the apprenticeship made 
                                                 
49
 The first de-regulation measures that are relevant for our analysis were approved in 2001 and they loosen fixed 
term contracts, which liberalization was first introduced in 1997 with the ‘Treu Laws’. The 2001 decree modified some 
aspects of the fixed term contracts, making their use more generic (see Cappellari et al., 2010). In 2003, the ‘Biagi 
Laws’ allowed new forms of apprenticeships and made easier to use temporary contracts. This reform increased age for 
apprenticeship from 26 to 30 years old and made easier for firms to accomplish the mandatory training that is basically 
the reason why those contracts exist. The implementation of the Biagi’s measures started in late 2005 and by 2006 it 
had reached the most important sectors (see Bosio and Leonardi, 2010, for more details). 
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less costly hiring and firing. On the other hand the 2001 decree does seem to have increased the cost 
of workers. So with respect the changes in the cost of hiring, the two reforms seem to have had 
opposite effects. It’s not yet clear though which one prevails and it’s may be too soon to draw 
conclusions about the overall impact. Anyway, for the purpose of this paper employment protection 
reforms are only relevant if they altered the cost ratio of graduates with respect to non graduates, 
but not if both groups of workers’ costs are influenced to the same extent. Here we will provide 
evidence showing that the relative cost of graduates should not have decreased with respect to non-
graduates, thus the variation in the demand for skilled workers should be at most downward biased.  
For sociologists flexibility refers to the insecurity that a worker has about the duration of the 
employment contract; they claim that unskilled workers are more exposed to insecure job positions 
(Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005), because they are easily replaced (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). 
Marsden (1995) argues that skilled workers are more likely to enjoy long-term contracts, because 
they play a crucial role in promoting cooperation at firm level. So from a sociological perspective 
there is no reason to believe that graduates became less expensive with respect to unskilled workers, 
but, on the contrary, their claim is that they become relatively more costly.  
According to SHIW survey, in 2000 15% of the workers with a temporary contract were 
graduates, while in 2008 they were 19% (see Table 5).50 Among those employed permanently 
graduates were 12% and 16% in 2000 and 2008 respectively. So, the share of graduates has 
increased in both the groups, but it increased more in the group of permanent workers (+33% versus 
+26%). Note that in this data set it’s not possible to distinguish further the type of temporary 
contract. This evidence agrees with the sociologists that claim that the use of temporary contract 
should not be diffusing faster among skilled workers, but among unskilled. 
 
Share of graduates on workers, by type of contract 
Type of contract: 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Permanent 0,12 0,14 0,11 0,12 0,16 
Temporary 0,15 0,12 0,21 0,23 0,19 
Table 5 Share of graduates on total work force by type of contract, excluding those that are employed in the 
Public Administration; source: SHIW 2000-2008. 
 
This evidence suggests that graduates are increasingly more required by employers and that 
the use of temporary contracts did not lower their relative cost, expressed by the type of contract.  
 
3.7.2 General trend 
Another problem is if the effect of the reform is confused with a general upgrade in the skills 
required to workers. If, for instance, over the same years there was a substantial reduction in those 
sectors for which the unskilled workers are needed, we would have observed an increase in the 
share of skilled workers not because more skilled human capital became available (supply push), 
but because the low skilled human capital intensity sectors are downsizing. In this case we would 
overestimate the effect of the reform. Looking at the distribution of graduates across sectors 
(defined at two digit level), we don’t find any significant difference in the industries that underwent 
a reduction in the share of skilled human capital and those that didn’t. Instead we find that the share 
of graduates increased across all sectors but 8 (out of 54), even if at different rates (see Table 11 in 
the Appendix). Moreover, in the manufacturing sectors that are expected to downsize, the share of 
graduates increased.  
As a further control for testing possible trends in the upgrading of the labor force we run a 
regression including only graduates whose courses length was not modified. The reform in fact 
changed the legal duration of the majority of the degrees but left unaltered the duration of medicine, 
dentistry, architecture, law, construction engineering and pharmacology degrees. Notice that since 
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 The SHIW is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth and it is provided by the Bank of Italy from 1980 
onwards. It’s is freely available from: http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait/dismicro/storico/stata 
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in the survey public enterprises are excluded, the number of required doctors is anyway small. So 
we consider the same probit model for the probability of hiring a graduate, but we take into account 
only potential workers whose degree duration was not altered. Results are shown in Table 10 
column (5). The time effect is very close to 0, even if it still retains statistical significance. This 
result suggests that there might be an increasing trend in the demand for skilled workers, as the 
probability of being hired increased also for the graduates with non-reformed degrees. However, the 
time effect is very close to zero and small if compared with the case in which all graduates are 
considered. So if the required number of graduates workers with a reformed degree did increase at 
the same rate as the number of workers with a non-reformed degree, the expected expansion in the 
demand for graduates would have been more limited. Two caveats prevent us from using as a 
proper control this group of degrees: a) the required workers with these degree are just a very small 
fraction of the required graduates (1% of all required graduates); b) the control group degrees are 
not equivalent to the group of reformed degree. So for this reform it does not exist a proper control 
group to take into account properly a time trend. 
 
3.7.3 The 2008 crisis 
Lastly, the effect of the reform could be hindered by the 2008 international crisis, when our 
last survey was taken.  
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Figure 1 Share of graduates looking for a job among, by macro area. Source: Istat, Labor force survey, 
years: 2004-2008. 
The reader should take into account that the post reform period collects surveys from 2007 to 
2009, that predicts hiring practice the current years; unfortunately we don’t have information on 
each year so we can’t exclude from the analysis all the surveys taken in 2009, but only those that 
answer just in 2009.51 Anyway, there is evidence that the crisis was unexpected (at lest in 2007 and 
2008) so that the first two surveys of the post reform period can be used safely.  
In order to control for the possible downward bias caused by the crisis, the analysis includes 
controls aimed at capturing the effect of reduction in total employment in each firm. In this way we 
purged the effect of the reform from firms’ downsizing. The marginal effect of the expected 
turnover on the probability of hiring a graduate is not different from zero (see again Table 9 in the 
Appendix), meaning that there is no relationship between firms downsizing and the demand for 
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 Since the crisis happened in September and firms are interviewed in January, we assume that the 2008 survey can be 
used without problems. 
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graduates. Anyway, unless there is evidence that the decrease in hiring had been sharper for 
unskilled human capital than for skilled, the ratio graduates vs. non graduates is not altered. In 
Table 10 in the Appendix we run the probit regression that estimates the probability of hiring 
graduates, excluding those firms that were in the survey just in 2009 (see column 4), but results do 
not differ significantly (compare column 1 and 4 in Table 10). Note that we can exclude the last 
survey only for firms that are in the survey only in 2009, so the number of excluded firms is small, 
as the majority was interviewed at least in another year during the post-reform sub-period.  
Using data collected from the Istat (National Institute of Statistics) - Labor Force surveys, we 
monitored the share of graduates among people that are looking for a job from 2004. Figure 1 
shows that there is no great variation in the last years, although the effect of the crisis should 
become evident during 2009, whose data are not available yet. However, this graph suggests that 
the share of unemployed graduates didn’t increase dramatically in the last years. So the crisis didn’t 
alter the graduate non-graduate ratio.  
 
So ideally we would like to find a way that could tell us how firms would have behaved if the 
only event that happened between the two periods was the reform, that is we want to separate the 
effect of the reform from any macro trend and from the changes in labor cost caused by the 
introduction of the flexible contracts. Unfortunately up to now, no data source allows the researcher 
to control for all the changes in the environment firms face before and after the reform. 
 
3.8  Do short graduates find a job? 
To get more insights into the effect of the reform, we analyze, in the post reform era, how 
employers’ preferences are revealed when choosing between a BA and a MA graduate. In the 
survey they also have the option to say that they are indifferent between the two. Since before the 
reform the distinction between BA and MA degree didn’t exist, it is interesting to observe to what 
are the job characteristics associated to the two types of workers.   
 
Type of degree Freq. Percent Percent (only on grads) 
No degree 579757 85.97   
BA (3-years degree) 16207 2.40 17.13 
MA (5-years degree) 42146 6.25 44.54 
Indifferent 36281 5.38 38.34 
Total 674391 100.00 100 
Table 6 Employers preferences over the different degrees in the post reform period 
  
Table 6 above clearly shows that MA graduates are preferred over BA graduates, and that 
whenever an employer wants to hire a graduate she/he is indifferent between the two types 38% of 
the times. We could say that the newly created BA degree didn’t meet market needs, as it is only a 
requirement for a small fraction of firms. Another worrying outcome is that the share of 
undetermined employers not expressing a preference for either of the two options is relevant. We 
could argue that this is because employers still don’t know how well trained are new graduates, or 
because the job that the new worker is asked to do can be done by both of the types. So we could 
say that for 38% of the new jobs created, employers believe that there is no big difference between 
a BA and a MA graduate. 45% of the times instead employers evaluate not sufficient the BA 
degree. Overall it seems that on one side there is still uncertainty about reform’s outcomes and that 
in order to increase the probability of being hired a student should take the MA degree. This last 
result partly invalidates the reform’s aims. Anyway, these results should be interpreted with caution 
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as they show only employers’ plans and we would be far more conclusive knowing who is actually 
hired.  
In order to see how the choice of a type of graduate is correlated with the observable 
characteristics we perform a multinomial logit model.52 So first we model the choice of the 
employers over four possible outcomes: she/he can hire a non graduate, a BA graduate, a MA 
graduate or be indifferent between the two types. Then, in another model we concentrate only on 
graduates and so the choice is modeled over three possible outcomes: BA or MA or indifferent. In 
principle this last model should take into account that there is first a selection into the choice of 
hiring a graduate or not, and then one can choose the type of degree that best fits firm’s needs. This 
would translate into a selection probit model followed by a multinomial one and given the number 
of observation it would be computationally too burdensome to perform.   
Table 13 in the Appendix reports the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit model in 
columns (1) to (3) and the marginal effects in columns (4) to (7).  
Non-graduates are in general not required for the first four Istat categories, because they are 
mostly required for semi/non-qualified occupations that form the residual category. For graduates 
instead the employers’ choice is equally distributed between indifference and MA degree for the 
two first occupation categories (managers and highly specialized jobs). BA graduates are not more 
attractive than MA graduates for any kind of job, while for clerks and technicians employers are 
indifferent. This is hard to interpret because we don’t know why the employer is indifferent (lack of 
information about the reform? Or because the job can be done by any type of graduate? Or because 
there is no difference between them?). Permanent contracts are clearly more frequent for MA 
graduates, while temporary are for non graduates. For the two remaining categories there is no clear 
pattern. Young people are required among non graduates, while people older than 25 are preferred 
among MA graduates. Again a gender preference is expressed when choosing non graduates while 
employers are indifferent when choosing a MA graduate. This is consistent with the fact that for 
those jobs where a MA graduate is needed it would be unreasonable to prefer men over women or 
vice versa. Bigger firms tend to prefer graduates over non graduates, but they rarely choose a BA 
graduate. Overall we could say that the choice of MA graduate is clearly opposed to not choosing a 
graduate, but no obvious relationship emerges when dealing with BA graduate or with the 
indifference category. In this sense it seems that preferring a worker with a short degree is not yet 
characterized. Those with a short degree are only marginally preferred for qualified jobs. Employers 
do make a clear distinction between non graduates and MA graduates, but the other two options are 
not differentiated systematically.  
Table 14 in the Appendix shows results from a similar multinomial logit model, with the 
exception that here non graduates are excluded. BA graduates are never preferred for any jobs, 
except when a young worker is wanted. Big firms seem to be those that more frequently choose the 
‘indifference’ option. Permanent contracts are more frequent among those that clearly prefer a 
candidate with either the short or the long degree.  
Probably in order to get some more insights we would need further information about firms’ 
precise needs and the personnel actually hired. In this way our analysis wouldn’t be puzzled by the 
indifference category.  
 
 
3.9 Did the type of required skills change over time? 
Since in the survey the employers are asked to indicate also the new worker’s field of studies, 
we classified the different fields into three macro areas to investigate potential changes in 
employers’ preferences.  
So each new graduate worker can be classified into three mutually exclusive categories: as a 
science graduate (if he/she got a degree in architecture, agricultural studies, engineering, chemistry, 
                                                 
52
 The purpose of this part of analysis is merely descriptive since the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property is 
not satisfied by the two models presented here.    
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biology, medicine, mathematics or physics), as a political scientist (if the degree is in economics, 
business & management, statistics, sociology or in political sciences) or as a literate (if the degree is 
in humanities: law, modern and ancient languages, philosophy or psychology). Table 7 shows 
required graduates classified by field of study, by occupation and by time, so that for each 
occupation we can observe the share of graduates’ field of study. The last three columns show the 
growth rate of the graduates’ field of study share.  
Overall scientific degrees are required more frequently than the others, even if the share of 
scientific degrees is declining over time (-0,8%). The second most wanted degrees are the ones 
included in the political sciences category, and also in this case the same declining trend is observed 
(-0.9%). The humanities category which covers a wide range of subjects (from Italian, to History, 
including Communications), instead showed an increase (+216%), but it’s still the less important in 
terms of share.  
 
  2001-2003 2007-2009 Growth rate 
  Science  Pol-
science Humanities Science 
Pol-
science Humanities Science 
Pol-
science Humanities 
Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 0,34 0,64 0,02 0,29 0,66 0,05 -0,12 0,02 1,16 
Professionals 0,69 0,26 0,05 0,73 0,17 0,10 0,06 -0,34 0,91 
Technicians and 
associate professionals 0,59 0,38 0,03 0,56 0,30 0,14 -0,04 -0,22 3,46 
Clerks 0,01 0,98 0,01 0,02 0,90 0,08 1,65 -0,09 8,92 
Sales workers and semi-
qualified, non -qualified 
occupations 
0,88 0,12 0,00 0,74 0,20 0,07 -0,17 0,72 15,34 
Total 0,59 0,38 0,04 0,54 0,34 0,12 -0,08 -0,09 2,16 
Table 7 Share of required field, by occupation (only for graduates) 
 
Table 15 in the Appendix show the results of six probit models for the probability to choose 
each type of degree first against all possible workers (general case) and then only against other 
graduates. So, controlling for other confounding factors, we can observe how the university reform 
(and all the other events) affect employers’ preferences over prospective workers’ field of study. 
 The share of workers with a degree in humanities (in column 1 and 4) increased over time 
only with respect to other graduates. This is due to the fact that those with a degree in humanities 
are just a small fraction of workers if compared to the full set of required workers. Looking at 
results in column (4) we find that ‘literate’ workers are required for the managerial and clerical 
professions, that experience is a requisite and that there is preference for women. This group is 
hired on a temporary basis. Those with a degree in science are hired more frequently in the post 
reform era in both the general and the restricted case (the one where only graduates are compared); 
they are more likely to be hired with a permanent contract. Science graduate women are never 
preferred and training is a prerequisite, while experience not (even if it’s not completely clear the 
difference between the two). Employers declare that finding a suitable worker with a science degree 
is problematic. If we look at the column (5), we find that the category of science graduates is always 
negatively associated to the professions categories in the analysis, because people with the other 
types of degree are required more frequently for more diffused occupations (especially those with a 
humanity degree).53 Political-scientist category (columns 3 and 6) shows a little increase after the 
reform in the general case, but a declining one if we compare them only with graduates. In the 
general case no clear pattern emerges in the characteristics of firms and job that are more likely 
associated with those types of workers. In the comparison with other graduates, economists are not 
                                                 
53
 Note that the occupations, for which science graduates are mostly wanted, do not have a great weight in the whole 
economy (i.e. high professionals jobs are only a small fraction of the jobs in the whole system).  
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difficult to find. Overall, it seems that those with a scientific degree are difficult to find and this 
may suggest that universities don’t meet market needs for those jobs that require scientific skills.  
Anyway these problems are not related specifically with the reform. It would be interesting to 
analyze whether this decline in the preference for political-science graduates is caused by syllabuses 
simplifications that resulted from the reform. As we mentioned before, it could be the case that 
employers rather than choosing a graduate in business prefer an engineer, because the mathematics 
syllabuses in the business courses have been simplified too much under the new regime. At the 
same time people with a degree in humanities could have substituted those with a secondary school 
diploma. Anyway with the available data we can not go into further details and answer precisely 
these questions.  
 
 
3.10 Conclusions 
 
In 2001the Italian university system went through a reform that modified the length of courses 
and simplified contents. The unitary-tier ‘regime’ that officially lasted for four to six years was 
substituted with a two-tier system, lasting 3 and 2 years respectively. Students that stop after the 
first three years get a BA degree, while those that continue for 2 more years specialize and get a 
MA equivalent degree. The reform is meant to uniform the Italian higher educational to the uniform 
European Educational System and to overcome some problems, such as: high age at degree, 
curricula rigidities and high drop out rate and low enrolment.  
Up to now the empirical literature mostly focused on the effect of the reform on the 
enrollment decision, drop out and age at degree. There is a general agreement that the reform has 
been successful in increasing access to university and decreasing drop out, even if the 
aforementioned problems are not completely weed out. 
In this study we explored what happened when graduates from the new ‘regime’ entered the 
labor market and substituted the old ‘regime’ graduates. So we paid attention to employers’ choices 
and we tried to identify the demand for graduates from six surveys that ask employers about their 
intentions on prospective workers.  
In the years after the reform the required share of graduates increased by 0.7%: the effect is 
small but significant. The effect is bigger (+ 3.5%) if we consider that together with educational 
level other workers’ characteristics might have varied.  
We present and discuss other concurrent events might have altered this result. Two reforms 
that liberalized the use of temporary contracts were implemented in the same years and they could 
have modified labor cost. However, it’s not clear yet if the two reforms increased or decreased labor 
cost and more importantly if they altered the relative cost of graduates with respect to non 
graduates. Evidence provided shows that the relative cost of skilled workers should be at most 
increased, thus leading us to underestimate the variation in the demand for skilled workers caused 
by the university reform.  
Any underlying increasing trend in the demand for skills could have also biased the effect of 
reform; so a) we perform a control experiment in which in include only the required workers with 
degrees whose length was not modified by the reform and b) we checked whether there was a 
sudden expansion in highly technological sectors; both these checks do not reveal any general 
increasing trend in the demand for graduates.  
The international 2008 crisis might have biased our relationship, so using data collected by 
Istat on labor forces, we show that at least the ratio between skilled and unskilled unemployed is 
stable over time, fact that attenuates our worries about the impact of the crisis. We also exclude 
from the regression model the firms that only answered the survey in 2009 and results do not 
change.  
A part from the general increase in the share of graduates in the new labor force, we analyzed 
other features of the expected demand for workers.  
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First we focused on a decomposition of the demand for graduates looking at each occupation. 
We found that the demand for graduates increased for clerical and technical jobs, but decreased for 
the managerial and scientific occupations. So graduates are substituting less skilled workers in mid-
qualified jobs. More skilled workers are searched for less specialized works.  
Another aspect that is interesting to observe is how employers’ preferences are shaped with 
respect to the types of degree that are available in the post reform era: BA and MA degrees. Results 
are quite blur because employers could also tick the ‘indifference’ option, but it seems that the 
demand for BA graduates is still undefined and that big firms seem to be still undetermined about 
the difference between the two types. BA graduates are only required when a young and qualified 
worker is needed, which is not very frequent though.  
This evidence showed here is suggestive of a small but significant increase in the share of 
graduates among the newly hired workers that is not attributable to changes in firms’ 
characteristics. The growth in the demand for graduates grew at a slower rate if compared to the 
growth in the supply of graduates. From the Excelsior survey we know that the growth rate of the 
number of required graduates is equal to 40% (in the pre reform period firms asked for 72270 
graduates while in the post reform period for 101163), while the growth rate in the supply of 
graduates is equal to 67%, according to CNVSU (in the three years before the reform there were 
534318 new graduates, while after 893516). The reform was quite successful in creating more 
skilled human capital, but firms’ demand for graduates reacts mildly to the increase in the number 
of well-educated workers.  
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3.11 Appendix 
 
  
2001-2003 and 2007-2009 2001-2003 2007-2009 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 0,01 0,08 0 1 0,01 0,087 0,00 0,066 
Professionals 0,05 0,23 0 1 0,06 0,235 0,05 0,219 
Technicians and associate professionals 0,15 0,36 0 1 0,16 0,365 0,15 0,357 
Clerks 0,09 0,28 0 1 0,08 0,270 0,10 0,297 
Sales workers and semi-qualified, non -
qualified occupations 0,70 0,46 0 1 0,70 0,460 0,70 0,459 
compulsory schooling: lower secondary 0,35 0,48 0 1 0,39 0,487 0,32 0,468 
vocational training, regional 0,09 0,29 0 1 0,08 0,272 0,11 0,309 
vocational training, state courses 0,10 0,31 0 1 0,11 0,317 0,10 0,296 
secondary school 0,32 0,47 0 1 0,30 0,458 0,33 0,471 
short degree/diploma 0,02 0,15 0 1 0,02 0,144 0,02 0,153 
long degree/old regime 0,11 0,31 0 1 0,10 0,298 0,12 0,321 
Permanent contract 0,48 0,42 0 1 0,57 0,399 0,39 0,428 
age<25 0,14 0,34 0 1 0,23 0,419 0,06 0,229 
age>25 0,47 0,50 0 1 0,39 0,487 0,55 0,498 
indiff 0,39 0,49 0 1 0,38 0,486 0,40 0,489 
Experience required 0,61 0,40 0 1 0,54 0,424 0,68 0,383 
Experience not required 0,39 0,49 0 1 0,46 0,498 0,32 0,466 
training required 0,77 0,42 0 1 0,69 0,464 0,85 0,358 
training not required 0,23 0,42 0 1 0,31 0,464 0,15 0,358 
it knowledge required 0,34 0,47 0 1 0,34 0,473 0,33 0,472 
it knowledge not required 0,66 0,47 0 1 0,66 0,473 0,67 0,472 
woman preferred 0,11 0,31 0 1 0,07 0,256 0,14 0,346 
man preferred 0,17 0,37 0 1 0,10 0,298 0,23 0,418 
sex indiff 0,73 0,44 0 1 0,83 0,375 0,63 0,482 
foreign language required 0,21 0,40 0 1 0,24 0,426 0,18 0,382 
foreign lang not required 0,79 0,40 0 1 0,76 0,426 0,82 0,382 
no probl in finding 0,70 0,46 0 1 0,64 0,479 0,76 0,426 
problems in finding,lack of people with 
the appropriate qualification 0,08 0,27 0 1 0,10 0,296 0,07 0,248 
problems in finding,lack of appropriate 
educational facilities  0,02 0,13 0 1 0,03 0,159 0,01 0,084 
problems in finding,high competition 
among firms for similar workers 0,14 0,34 0 1 0,18 0,388 0,09 0,290 
problems in finding,other reasons 0,06 0,24 0 1 0,05 0,215 0,07 0,261 
Exporting firm 0,35 0,48 0 1 0,29 0,452 0,41 0,492 
Expected turnover, by firm 0,02 0,16 -7.1 19 0,01 0,136 0,03 0,177 
employee<20 0,05 0,22 0 1 0,04 0,205 0,06 0,228 
20<employee<50 0,03 0,17 0 1 0,02 0,143 0,04 0,194 
50<employee<250 0,22 0,41 0 1 0,21 0,410 0,23 0,419 
employee>250 0,70 0,46 0 1 0,72 0,448 0,68 0,467 
centre 0,18 0,39 0 1 0,17 0,377 0,19 0,392 
south 0,11 0,31 0 1 0,09 0,291 0,12 0,330 
north-east 0,31 0,46 0 1 0,30 0,460 0,31 0,463 
north-west 0,40 0,49 0 1 0,43 0,495 0,37 0,484 
Obs 1294990    620594  674396  
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the required workers and of the firms.  Each 
observation corresponds to the prospective worker. 
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dependent variable: (weighted) number of graduates required 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
period 2001-2003 2007-2009 01-03 vs  07-09 01-03 vs  07-09 
2007-2009     0.00684*** 0.0351*** 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.875*** 0.869*** 0.873***   
Professionals 0.877*** 0.930*** 0.904***   
Technicians and associate professionals 0.314*** 0.538*** 0.418***   
Clerks 0.0800*** 0.339*** 0.207***   
Sales workers and semi-qualified, non -qualified 
occupations ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome   
Permanent contract 0.00201 0.00109** 0.00251***   
age<25 -0.00356** -0.00193*** -0.00437***   
age>25 0.00376** 0.0005 0.00172*   
indiff ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome   
experience required -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002   
experience not required ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome   
training required 0.00525*** 0.000377 0.00284***   
training not required ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome   
it knowledge required 0.000427 0.000342 0.00130   
it knowledge not required ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome   
woman preferred -0.00488*** -0.00146** -0.00375***   
man preferred -0.00352*** -0.00208*** -0.00393***   
indiff ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome   
foreign language required 0.00771*** 0.00379*** 0.0067***   
foreign lang not required ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome   
problems in finding,lack of people with the 
appropriate qualification 0.00162 0.000701 0.00161* 0.0443*** 
problems in finding,lack of appropriate educational 
facilities  -0.000266 -0.000483 -0.0004 0.0246 
problems in finding,high competition among firms for 
similar workers 0.00352** 0.00382** 0.0049*** 0.0514*** 
problems in finding,other reasons -0.0001 0.0003 -0.000376 -0.0398*** 
no problems in finding ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome 
exporting firm -0.000283 0.0002 0.0006 0.0330*** 
not exporting firm ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome 
Expected turnover, by firm -0.00595* 0.00127** 0.0003 0.0036 
20<employee<50 0.00496* 0.001 0.00261** 0.0453*** 
50<employee<250 0.00698*** 0.00270*** 0.0057*** 0.0712*** 
employee>250 0.00817*** 0.00293*** 0.0067*** 0.0711*** 
employee<20 ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome 
south 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0178** 
north-east -0.00211 -0.000745 -0.00162 -0.0348*** 
north-west 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0103 
centre ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome ref outcome 
Controls for industry yes yes yes yes 
Observations 622159 674238 1299856 1299856 
Pseudo R-squared 0.621 0.647 0.630 0.227 
Table 9: column (1) and (2) marginal effect of the probit model for the probability of hiring a graduate, pre 
reform and post reform period respectively. Columns (3): the same probit model over the two periods. Column 
(4): the before and after comparison without workers’ characteristics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable (weighted) graduate required  
  
only firms 
always 
respondent 
only firms 
always 
respondent  
no char. 
no 2009 
only 
respondent 
Only on 
‘control’ 
group 
2007-2009 0.0068*** 0.0073*** 0.0372*** 0.0068*** 4.34e-05** 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.87*** 0.883***  0.878*** 0.140*** 
Professionals 0.9*** 0.908***  0.908*** 0.444*** 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.42*** 0.433***  0.424*** 0.0105*** 
Clerks 0.21*** 0.214***  0.210*** 0.00105** 
Sales workers and semi-qualified, non –qual occupations base cat base cat  base cat base cat 
Permanent contract 0.0025*** 0.003***  0.0028*** 6.93E-07 
age<25 -0.004*** -0.0046***  -0.0045*** -1.09E-05 
age>25 0.00176* 0.00186*  0.00178* 8.04E-06 
indiff base cat base cat  base cat base cat 
experience required -0.0002 -0.00001  -0.0002 4.29E-06 
experience not required base cat base cat  base cat base cat 
training required 0.0028*** 0.0032***  0.0029*** 3.47E-06 
training not required base cat base cat  base cat base cat 
it knowledge required 0.0013 0.0016  0.0013 1.44E-05 
it knowledge not required base cat base cat  base cat base cat 
woman preferred -0.004*** -0.004***  -0.004*** -9.92e-06* 
man preferred -0.004*** -0.0043***  -0.004*** -1.24e-05* 
indiff base cat base cat  base cat base cat 
foreign language required 0.0067*** 0.0074***  0.007*** -2.15E-06 
foreign lang not required base cat base cat  base cat base cat 
problems in finding,lack of people with appropriate qualification 0.00161* 0.00164 0.045*** 0.00174* 2.42E-06 
problems in finding,lack of appropriate educational facilities -0.0004 -0.0004 0.025 -0.00027 -6.89E-06 
problems in finding,high competition among firms for similar 
workers 0.005*** 0.0052*** 0.053*** 0.005*** 8.60E-06 
problems in finding,other reasons -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.042*** -0.0004 -1.25e-05* 
no problems in finding base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
exporting firm 0.0006 0.0007 0.0323*** 0.0006 3.52E-07 
not exporting firm base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Expected turnover, by firm 0.0003 0 0.002 0.0004 -2.16E-05 
20<employee<50 0.0026** 0.0028* 0.05*** 0.0028** 5.81E-06 
50<employee<250 0.0057*** 0.0055*** 0.07*** 0.0058*** 1.05E-05 
employee>250 0.0067*** 0.0065*** 0.07*** 0.0068*** 1.42e-05* 
employee<20 base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
south 0.00019 0.000159 -0.02*** 0.000272 -8.96e-06* 
north-east -0.0016 -0.0022* -0.04*** -0.0016 -9.86E-06 
north-west -0.0002 -0.0006 0.01 -0.0002 -7.95E-06 
centre base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Controls for industry yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1299856 1206828 1206828 1286458 1135210 
Pseudo R-squared 0.629 0.63 0.227 0.63 0.684 
Table 10: column (1) replicates column(3) of Table 9; column (2) includes only firms that were in the surveys in 
both periods; column (3) reports the result for the always respondent firms excluding the workers characteristics 
that could be determined jointly with educational level; column (4) excludes firms that were in the survey just in 
2009; column (5) includes only the demand for graduates for those degrees whose length was not modified by the 
reform. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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  Share of graduates 
Industries Pre Reform Post Reform 
GROWTH RATE 
Real estate 0,24 0,10 -0,60 
Food and beverages 0,08 0,04 -0,52 
Retail  0,03 0,02 -0,37 
Extraction (non oil) 0,04 0,03 -0,26 
Automotive: trade and repair 0,12 0,09 -0,24 
Energy: production and distribution 0,22 0,18 -0,17 
Recreational 0,14 0,13 -0,10 
Office machinery manufacturing 0,63 0,58 -0,07 
Health and social assistance 0,27 0,26 -0,05 
Chemical manufacturing 0,40 0,41 0,03 
Hotels and restaurants 0,01 0,01 0,05 
Textile 0,06 0,07 0,05 
Family facilities 0,03 0,04 0,10 
Press and publishing 0,18 0,21 0,15 
IT 0,51 0,58 0,15 
Wholesale trade 0,10 0,12 0,21 
Construction 0,05 0,06 0,21 
Research and development 0,62 0,75 0,22 
Consultancy agencies 0,07 0,08 0,22 
Land transport 0,02 0,03 0,25 
Insurance and pension funds 0,34 0,44 0,29 
Agriculture and hunting 0,03 0,04 0,32 
Financial broker (auxiliary) 0,46 0,61 0,32 
Financial broker (main) 0,41 0,54 0,32 
Medical instruments manufacturing 0,16 0,22 0,35 
Manufacturing 0,07 0,10 0,45 
Rubber products manufacturing 0,07 0,11 0,45 
Machinery manufacturing 0,15 0,22 0,47 
Maritime transports 0,03 0,04 0,48 
Education 0,37 0,58 0,57 
Extraction (Oil) 0,39 0,61 0,57 
Furniture manufacturing 0,04 0,06 0,57 
Tv and radio manufacturing 0,25 0,40 0,58 
Steel 0,05 0,08 0,58 
Refinery 0,24 0,41 0,71 
Water  0,11 0,19 0,72 
Air transport 0,05 0,10 0,80 
Leather manufacturing 0,04 0,07 0,81 
Steel manufacturing 0,04 0,09 1,02 
Automotive manufacturing 0,09 0,18 1,03 
Mechanical machinery manufacturing 0,11 0,22 1,05 
Travel agency 0,02 0,04 1,14 
Waste disposal 0,03 0,06 1,17 
Means of transportation (automotive excluded) 0,15 0,34 1,21 
Clothing and furs 0,07 0,15 1,21 
Paper 0,04 0,10 1,48 
Wood (no furniture) 0,01 0,04 1,97 
Means of transportation hiring 0,06 0,23 2,60 
Telecommunications 0,07 0,26 2,76 
Recycling 0,005 0,04 8,29 
Forestry Coal and wood coal extraction, Oil-mining, Tobacco 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Table 11: Share of graduates by sector in the pre reform and post reform period, and growth rate. 
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  Pre reform Post reform Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Occupations: 
no 
grads grads Total 
no 
grads grads Total Totj/totocc 
Gradj/ 
totgrad Gradj/occj 
Fix sh 
gr + 
Var 
occ 
Fix occ 
+ Var 
sh gr 
Legislators, 
senior officials 
and managers 
1010 3673 4683 762 2371 3133 0,01 0,005 0,05 0,02 0,78 0,76 -0,002 0,000 
Professionals 5610 30428 36038 5459 32133 37592 0,06 0,06 0,43 0,32 0,84 0,85 -0,003 0,001 
Technicians and 
associate 
professionals 
63997 31845 95842 49863 52727 102590 0,16 0,15 0,44 0,52 0,33 0,51 -0,002 0,028 
Clerks 44483 4339 48822 53252 13664 66916 0,08 0,10 0,06 0,14 0,09 0,20 0,002 0,009 
Sales workers 
and semi-
qualified, non -
qualified 
occupations 
430715 1290 432005 470399 152 470551 0,70 0,69 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,000 -0,002 
Total 545815 71575 617390 579735 101047 680782 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,12 0,15 0,0000 0,032 
Table 12: Decomposition of the variation of graduates by occupation j.  Columns (1) to (3) show the number of 
non graduates, graduates and their sum for each job type, in the pre reform period; columns (4) to (6)  show the 
same variables, but are referred to the post reform period.  Column (7) is the ratio between the number of new 
workers for each type of job and the new workers required in the whole economy, again for both the time 
periods considered. Column (8) is the share of graduates in each occupation on the total number of graduates in 
the economy, while column (9) is the share of graduates in job j on the number of workers in job j. Column (10) 
tells how would have changed the share of graduates if only the weight of job j would have changed in the 
economy. Column (11) instead reports how would have changed the share of graduates if the weight of job j in 
the economy would have stayed the same, but measures how each job j increased the skill intensity.    
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base category: no degree required 
  coefficients marginal effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  indiff BA MA no degree indiff BA MA 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 9.073*** 6.533*** 8.951*** -0.913*** 0.436*** 0.0132** 0.464*** 
Professionals 10.08*** 8.757*** 9.791*** -0.946*** 0.469*** 0.0513*** 0.426*** 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 8.316*** 7.612*** 7.593*** -0.572*** 0.308*** 0.0652*** 0.199*** 
Clerks 6.986*** 6.132*** 6.461*** -0.391*** 0.203*** 0.0362*** 0.151*** 
Sales workers and semi-qualified, 
non -qualified occupations base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Permanent contract 0.151 0.603*** 0.436*** -0.000552** 9.16e-05 0.000142 0.000319** 
age<25 -1.08*** 0.451 -1.8*** 0.000969** -0.000426** 0.000131 -0.000674*** 
age>25 0.129 0.462** 0.0871 -0.000249 7.81e-05 0.000107 6.33e-05 
indiff base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
experience required -0.0856 -0.180 0.0876 3.39e-05 -5.30e-05 -4.40e-05 6.31e-05 
experience not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
training required 0.287* 0.312* -0.143 -0.0001 0.000159 6.61e-05 -0.000110 
training not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
it knowledge required -0.248 0.127 0.321 -0.000134 -0.000145 3.05e-05 0.000248 
it knowledge not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
woman preferred -0.278 -1.09*** -0.64*** 0.000713** -0.000154 -0.00018 -0.000378*** 
man preferred -0.92*** -0.79*** -0.61*** 0.001*** -0.00045** -0.00015 -0.00038*** 
indiff base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
foreign language required 0.633*** 0.471*** 0.806*** -0.00139*** 0.00048* 0.00013 0.000783*** 
foreign lang not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
problems in finding,lack of people 
with the appropriate qualification -0.131 0.345 0.405*** -0.000375 -7.55e-05 9.49e-05 0.000355** 
problems in finding,lack of 
appropriate educational facilities -0.109 0.284 -0.92*** 0.000427 -6.27e-05 7.74e-05 -0.000442*** 
problems in finding,high 
competition among firms for 
similar workers 
0.526** 0.944*** 0.721*** -0.00146** 0.0004 0.00034 0.00072** 
problems in finding,other reasons -0.234 0.755*** -0.266 5.27e-05 -0.00013 0.00025 -0.000174 
no problems in finding base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
exporting firm 0.0217 -0.0381 0.0337 -2.90e-05 1.32e-05 -8.96e-06 2.47e-05 
not exporting firm base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Expected turnover, by firm 0.623** -1.282 -0.345 0.00017 0.00038* -0.0003 -0.00025 
20<employee<50 0.280 0.145 0.313** -0.0005* 0.00019 3.63e-05 0.0002 
50<employee<250 0.999*** 0.0851 0.448*** -0.00122*** 0.0008** 2.02e-05 0.000372** 
employee>250 1.551*** -0.116 0.988*** -0.00139*** 0.0008** -2.82e-05 0.0006*** 
employee<20 base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
south -0.0972 -0.288 0.0333 9.35e-05 -5.71e-05 -6.11e-05 2.47e-05 
north-east -0.240 -0.90*** 0.0309 0.0003 -0.00014 -0.00019 2.29e-05 
north-west 0.004 -0.649** -0.151 0.000249 2.59e-06 -0.000143 -0.0001 
centre base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Controls for industry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 674315 674315 674315 674315 674315 674315 674315 
Pseudo R-squared 0.530 0.530 0.530     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
Table 13 Multinomial logit model for employers’ choice among non graduates and the types of graduates. 
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base category: the employers is indifferent between the two types 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  coeff marginal effects 
  BA MA indiff BA MA 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers -3.614*** 0.345 -0.0398 -0.0945*** 0.134 
Professionals -2.257*** 0.236 0.0148 -0.150*** 0.135 
Technicians and associate 
professionals -1.664*** -0.168 0.102 -0.141*** 0.0389 
Clerks -0.963 0.193 -0.0156 -0.0642*** 0.0798 
Sales workers and semi-qualified, non 
-qualified occupations base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Permanent contract 0.489*** 0.407*** -0.102*** 0.0221* 0.0802** 
age<25 1.665*** -0.752* -0.0403 0.324*** -0.284*** 
age>25 0.374* -0.0355 -0.00568 0.0298** -0.0241 
indiff base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
experience required -0.0197 0.250 -0.0505 -0.0126 0.0630 
experience not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
training required -0.0423 -0.386** 0.0804** 0.0137 -0.0941** 
training not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
it knowledge required 0.468** 0.474* -0.117** 0.0177 0.0994* 
it knowledge not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
woman preferred -0.835* -0.434 0.121 -0.0405** -0.0804 
man preferred 0.119 0.266** -0.0586** -0.00244 0.0610** 
indiff base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
foreign language required -0.0302 0.129 -0.0254 -0.00808 0.0335 
foreign lang not required base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
problems in finding,lack of people 
with the appropriate qualification 0.445* 0.517*** -0.118*** 0.0120 0.106*** 
problems in finding,lack of 
appropriate educational facilities  0.139 -0.856*** 0.155** 0.0508* -0.206*** 
problems in finding,high competition 
among firms for similar workers 0.232 0.201 -0.0496 0.0101 0.0395 
problems in finding,other reasons 0.756* 0.0354 -0.0443 0.0797 -0.0354 
no problems in finding base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
exporting firm -0.140 0.00832 0.00359 -0.0118 0.00821 
not exporting firm base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Expected turnover, by firm -2.591** -1.799* 0.469** -0.132* -0.337 
20<employee<50 -0.320 -0.0716 0.0261 -0.0206 -0.00556 
50<employee<250 -1.151*** -0.732*** 0.195*** -0.0537*** -0.141*** 
employee>250 -1.833*** -0.758*** 0.220*** -0.152*** -0.0682 
employee<20 base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
south -0.343 0.0559 -0.000525 -0.0268* 0.0273 
north-east -0.689*** 0.230 -0.0272 -0.0562*** 0.0834 
north-west -0.716*** -0.166 0.0611 -0.0505*** -0.0106 
centre base cat base cat base cat base cat base cat 
Controls for industry yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 94635 94635 94635 94635 94635 
Pseudo R-squared 0.202     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Table 14 Multinomial logit model for employers’ choice among the length of degree.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  type of degree vs all individuals type of degree vs other graduates 
  humanities science 
pol-
sciences humanities science 
pol-
sciences 
2007-2009 4.14e-05 0.0014*** 0.00062** 0.0323*** 0.0455** -0.075*** 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 0.174*** 0.309*** 0.499*** 0.286** -0.413*** 0.141 
Professionals 0.175*** 0.562*** 0.236*** 0.186*** -0.130 -0.155 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.039*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.100*** -0.320*** 0.0448 
Clerks 0.025*** 0.0065** 0.065*** 0.329*** -0.548*** 0.106 
Sales workers and semi-qualified, non -
qualified occupations ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
Permanent contract -1.60e-05 0.00131*** -6.16e-06 -0.026*** 0.0906*** -0.033 
age<25 -1.77e-05 -0.001*** -0.0008** -0.0083 0.051 0.0097 
age>25 -8.98e-06 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0123** -0.0016 0.0331 
indiff ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
experience required 1.31e-05 -0.0007** 0.00035 0.0197*** -0.048** -0.016 
experience not required ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
training required -2.06e-06 0.0007*** 0.000217 -0.0077 0.0695*** -0.064*** 
training not required ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
it knowledge required -8.04e-06 0.0007** 0.0002 -0.028** 0.0506 0.0197 
it knowledge not required ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
woman preferred 3.91e-05 -0.00135*** -0.000434* 0.0645*** -0.169*** -0.0121 
man preferred -1.65e-05 -0.0006*** -0.0007** -0.017*** 0.055** -0.023 
indiff ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
foreign language required 2.90e-06 0.000605** 0.0021** -0.00097 -0.068*** 0.0901*** 
foreign lang not required ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
problems in finding,lack of people with 
the appropriate qualification 5.52e-06 0.001*** -0.0003 0.0028 0.079*** -0.07*** 
problems in finding,lack of appropriate 
educational facilities  -1.35e-05 0.00106* -0.0003 -0.024*** 0.154*** -0.0521 
problems in finding,high competition 
among firms for similar workers -9.45e-06 0.003*** -0.0005** -0.026*** 0.217*** -0.114*** 
problems in finding,other reasons 9.22e-07 0.00059 -0.0006* -0.00821 0.0687 -0.056* 
no problems in finding ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
exporting firm -4.22e-06 0.000780** -0.000126 -0.0119* 0.116*** -0.0368 
not exporting firm ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
Expected turnover, by firm 1.30e-05 -0.00244** -0.000548 0.0120 -0.332* -0.0649 
20<employee<50 7.48e-06 6.88e-05 0.000357 0.00244 -0.0890** 0.0116 
50<employee<250 8.22e-06 0.0012*** 0.00106** -0.00631 -0.0113 0.0159 
employee>250 1.00e-05 0.00125*** 0.00127*** -0.00731 -0.0331 0.0198 
employee<20 ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
south -6.69e-06 0.0007* -4.50e-05 -0.0118* 0.0849** 0.0148 
north-east 1.49e-05 -0.001*** 0.0003 0.031** -0.144*** 0.097*** 
north-west 2.95e-06 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0118 -0.0633** 0.061** 
centre ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat ref cat 
Controls for industry yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1285545 1299806 1299856 169498 173149 173152 
Pseudo R-squared 0.443 0.600 0.461 0.345 0.371 0.391 
Table 15 Probit models for employers’ preferences over workers’ field of study *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1 
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Conclusions 
 
 
This work shed some light on the effects of various reforms in education on attainment, 
fertility and labor market. 
The first chapter shows the effect of reforms in compulsory education that rose minimum 
leaving age on attainment. The work takes into account different countries that implemented the 
laws in the second half of the last century.   
By mean of research discontinuity design method, we show that reforms are effective in 
increasing average years of schooling, even if the effect varies among countries. A quantile 
regression approach takes into account variations of the distribution of education and reforms are 
shown to be most effective at the first quartile. So the reforms increased the educational level of the 
marginal student that would have stayed out of school without the reform. Since endogeneity is a 
problem common to many empirical studies that make use of human capital as an explanatory 
variable, we here provide further evidence in support of the use of the reforms as an instrument for 
education. Not only we show how reforms are effective, but also we suggest strategies that are 
useful for tackling the issue of identifying correctly people that are exposed to reform. So the first 
chapter can be considered as a ‘guideline’ for correctly measuring the variation in educational 
attainment caused by reforms.  
In the second chapter, focused on Ecuador, we analyze the relationship between education, 
teenage childbearing and labor supply. Since education is endogenous with respect to early 
motherhood, we instrument schooling with a reform that was implemented in 1977 and made 
compulsory the completion of lower secondary education.  
The results show that completing lower secondary schooling affects women’s age at first birth 
delaying motherhood after adolescence. Women’s labor supply is also positively affected by 
education and negatively by teenage childbearing. In addition, data suggest that to more educated 
women and to older mothers are associated better children outcomes, in terms of schooling. 
However, further evidence is needed in order to estimate precisely the size and the duration of the 
intergenerational effects. 
From a policy viewpoint, a reform on compulsory education not only can promote schooling 
attendance, but also increases women’s control over fertility choices and favors women’s labor 
supply. These results are relevant because in Ecuador gender differences on the labor market and on 
schooling attendance are evident, and investment in children’s education is still low. 
The final chapter is about a reform in the Italian university system, implemented in 2001 to 
modify the length of university degree and simplify course contents.   
A unitary-tier system that lasted for four to six years was substituted with a two-tier system, 
lasting 3 and 2 years respectively. Students that stop after the first three years get a BA degree, 
while those that continue for 2 more years specialize and get a MA equivalent degree. The reform’s 
purposes are to uniform Italy to the European higher educational, to lower age at degree and drop 
out rate and increase enrolment.  
Since the reform is recent, scholars mostly focused on the effects on the enrollment decision, 
drop out and age at degree and showed that the reform has been successful in increasing access to 
university and decreasing drop out. 
The present analysis investigates what happened when graduates from the new ‘regime’ 
entered the labor market and substituted the old ‘regime’ graduates. Using a data set on employers’ 
preferences over prospective workers, we identify the expected demand for graduates and we 
compare each worker’s required skills before and after the reform.  
In the years after the reform the required share of graduates increased by 0.7%: the effect is 
small but significant and not attributable to a change in firms’ characteristics. The demand for 
graduates increased mostly for clerical and technical jobs, but decreased for the managerial and 
scientific occupations. So more skilled workers are searched for less specialized works.  
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Since the reform generates two types of graduate, we investigate how employers’ preferences 
are shaped between these two options. The choice of BA graduates is not well characterized yet, 
while for some jobs is required a worker with the MA degree.  
Overall the reform was quite successful in creating more skilled human capital, and firms’ 
demand for graduates reacts, even if mildly, to the increase in the number of well-educated workers.  
We take into account and discuss that other concurrent events might have increased/decreased 
the post reform expected demand for workers. Two reforms that liberalized the use of temporary 
contracts were implemented in the same years, potentially modifying labor cost. However, for our 
purposes this is only relevant if the labor market reforms altered the relative cost of graduates with 
respect to non graduates. Evidence suggests that the relative cost of highly skilled human capital is 
unaltered or at most increased. The international 2008 crisis might have also interfered with the 
reform’s effect, but and we did our best to exclude 2009 from the analysis. More detailed data 
would probably help to solve at least a part of the potential biases. 
This dissertation shows that reforms in education are good policies to pursue different goals. 
In fact, the increase in educational attainment triggered by reforms can have spillover effects on 
fertility choices, women’s labor supply, children investment and on skill composition of the labor 
force. 
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